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The Supreme Court's recent treatment of the law of patent eligibility has
introduced an era of confusion, lack of administrability, and, ultimately,
risk of under-investment in research and development. As a result, patent
law - and in particular the law governing patent eligibility - is in a
state of crisis. In this Article, I show why, despite this crisis, it is highly
unlikely that the Supreme Court will correct itself and solve these
problems. I therefore proceed to consider how Congress might -
consistent with its constitutional authority - correct these problems
through appropriate legislation. I identify principles that should guide
Congress when it considers potential legislation, including amendments to
the patent statute. I then analyze several options for revising the existing
statutory language governing patent eligibility in light of those principles.
Such legislation is urgently needed to resolve the present crisis.
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The time has come for Congress to consider legislation to clarify the
law governing patent eligibility. The Supreme Court's recent treatment
of this aspect of patent law has introduced an era of confusion, lack of
administrability, and, ultimately, risk of under-investment in research
and development. Confusion reigns, for example, because the Court
has based its patent eligibility doctrine on policy concerns already and
better addressed by other statutory patent law doctrines. Moreover,
the Court has settled upon a test - the so-called Mayo two-part test
first articulated in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus
Laboratories, Inc. - that lacks administrability. 1 As a result of this
confusion and lack of administrability, the Court's two-part test has
created a significant risk of reduced incentive to invent. In short,
patent law - and in particular the law governing patent eligibility -
is in a state of crisis.
Despite this crisis, it is highly unlikely that the Supreme Court will
correct itself and solve these problems. In its recent decision in Alice
Corp. v. CLS Bank International, the Court doubled down on Mayo,
adopting the Mayo two-part test to govern the inquiry of all the so-
called exceptions to patent eligibility.2 Moreover, even more recently
in Kimble v. Marvel Enterprises, the Court showed how it would likely
rely upon the doctrine of stare decisis in the context of the law
governing patent eligibility to reject pleas to overturn its confusing
precedent.3 Anyway, the Court would have to grant a petition for
certiorari to even reach the question of whether the two-part test set
forth in Mayo and Alice should be overturned. And most recently the
Court denied certiorari in a case in which the Federal Circuit judges
and twenty-two amici - all in support of the petitioner and therefore
I See generally Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct.
1289 (2012). The first step asks whether the claim is directed to a patent-ineligible
concept such as a law of nature, and if so the second step asks whether the claim does
more than simply describe a natural relationship, which involves a search for an
"inventive concept." Id. at 1296-99.
2 See generally Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). The Court
described Mayo as "set[ting] forth a framework for distinguishing patents that claim
laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-
eligible applications of those concepts." Id. at 2355.
3 See Kimble v. Marvel Entm't, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2406 (2015). While
applying stare decisis as a basis not to overturn its precedent on a matter of patent
misuse law, the Court explicitly tied its analysis to its precedent on eligible subject
matter. See id. at 2410-11.
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certiorari - practically cried out for guidance on how to apply the
two-part test set forth in Mayo and Alice.4
In this Article, I therefore proceed to consider how Congress might
correct these problems through appropriate legislation. As a
preliminary matter, I show how, given the broad power granted to
Congress under the Constitution to fashion the conditions and
requirements of patentability, the Supreme Court would likely defer to
Congress and find legislation clarifying - and perhaps even
eliminating - the exceptions to be constitutional. I then contemplate
what approach Congress should take. I address whether the existing
statutory patentability and specification requirements sufficiently
address the relevant concerns raised by the Supreme Court in its cases
addressing eligibility. Ultimately, I conclude that the other
patentability and specification requirements already do, without
amendment, address those concerns. But even if they do not do so
sufficiently, I explain how the appropriate first step is for Congress to
consider amending those requirements. I identify principles that
should guide Congress when it considers potential legislation
addressing the law governing patent eligibility as opposed to the other
patentability and specification requirements: broad eligibility, clarity,
constraint on judicial intervention, and flexibility.
Using these guiding principles, I next analyze several options for
revising the existing statutory language governing patent eligibility.
One approach is what I call the "laundry list" approach, which would
amend the patent statute to identify specific subject matter that is
eligible or ineligible for patenting. In this way, Congress would decide
in advance what subject matter is eligible and ineligible, rather than
provide a rule or standard for the United States Patent and Trademark
Office or courts to apply in the future to make this determination.
Another approach is to create a workable standard with objective
limitations on eligibility. For example, Congress might put in place a
standard that eliminates from eligibility anything that is not the result
of human effort, or one that eliminates from eligibility anything that is
not a practical application of a natural law, physical phenomenon, or
abstract idea. The third approach would be to "lay the ghost" of the
exceptions to eligibility. In other words, have Congress expressly
eliminate the exceptions. Instead, the relevant policy concerns would
be addressed only by the patentability and specification requirements
actually expressed in the patent statute.
4 See Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir.
2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2511 (Mem.) (2016).
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To those ends, I have organized this Article into four parts. Part I
describes the basis for legislative action: the problems associated with
the Supreme Court's failure to identify a workable standard, the
unlikelihood of the Court reversing course, and the constitutionality
of Congress passing legislation addressing patent eligibility. Part 11
recognizes the ability of non-eligibility doctrines to address the policy
concerns that have driven the Supreme Court in its eligibility cases.
Part III identifies the principles that should guide any effort to pass
legislation to eliminate the crisis regarding patent eligibility: clarity,
broad eligibility, constraint on judicial intervention, and flexibility to
address unforeseen technologies. In light of these principles, Part IV
considers potential paths forward: (1) the "laundry list" approach; (2)
the codification of an exclusive, broad standard for patent examiners
and judges to apply to determine whether subject matter is ineligible;
and (3) an approach that would eliminate the eligibility exceptions in
favor of addressing the relevant policy concerns under existing and
modified versions of existing patentability doctrines.
I. BASIS FOR A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION
The Supreme Court's treatment of the law governing patent
eligibility has proven problematic in several respects. Given these
problems, it is clear that something ought to be done to improve this
area of the law. Unfortunately, it is also clear that the Supreme Court
lacks the willingness or ability to do so. Despite having an obsession
with the law governing patent eligibility, the Court has repeatedly
failed to identify a workable standard for patent eligibility,5 and most
recently it denied certiorari in an important case in which lower court
judges cried out for the Court to clarify the law.6 Moreover, it is
unlikely to overturn its precedent given the doctrine of stare decisis. As
a result, it is time for Congress to craft legislation to overrule the
Court's misguided law of ineligibility. Such legislation would be
constitutional, reflecting the legislature's role in crafting statutory law
that promotes the progress of the useful arts.7
5 See, e.g., Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2347; Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1289.
6 See Ariosa, 788 F.3d at 1379.
7 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (authorizing Congress to pass laws "[t]o
promote the Progress of ... useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to ... Inventors
the exclusive Right to their ... Discoveries").
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A. The Supreme Court's Failure to Identify a Workable Standard
The Supreme Court is both obsessed with the law governing eligible
subject matter and unable to identify a workable standard. Indeed, the
Court has paid significant attention to what it refers to as the "implicit
exception" (what I will refer to more accurately as the non-statutory
exceptions) to subject-matter eligibility,8 to the relative exclusion of
the patentability and specification requirements actually written in the
patent statute. And yet all the Court has to show for its efforts is
considerable confusion, a test that lacks administrability, and a result
that presents the significant risk of reduced incentive to invent.9
Regarding the Supreme Court's obsession with patent eligibility,
simply consider the data. In the five year period between 2010 and
2014, for example, the Court decided four cases on patent eligibilityo
and merely one case on any of the matters of utility, novelty, non-
obviousness, written description, enablement, definiteness, and
experimental use combined." Moreover, since 1976 - in other words,
in the last forty years - the Court has heard and decided eight cases on
subject matter eligibility.' 2 In the same time period, it has decided only
four cases addressing other doctrines: one on the test applicable under
35 U.S.C. § 102 and one on the test applicable under 35 U.S.C. § 103;13
two on the statutory experimental use exception; 14 and none on the
utility, written description, and enablement requirements. Thus, it is
quite clear that the Court is obsessed with the non-statutory exceptions
8 See Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293 ("The Court has long held that [35 U.S.C. § 101]
contains an important implicit exception. '[L]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas' are not patentable." (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185
(1981)).
9 See infra discussion accompanying notes 15-29.
10 See, e.g., Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2347; Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013); Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1289; Bilski v. Kappos, 561
U.S. 593 (2010).
H See Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2124 (2014)
(discussing claim definiteness).
12 See, e.g., Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2347; Ass'n for Molecular Pathology, 133 S. Ct. at
2107; Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1289; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 593; J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v.
Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175
(1981); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584
(1978).
13 See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007) (addressing § 103);
Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 57 (1998) (addressing § 102).
14 See Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences 1, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 208 (2005); Eli
Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 665 (1990).
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to patent eligibility, at least relative to the statutory patentability
requirements and other patent law doctrines.
Unfortunately, however, it is also quite clear that the Court's
decisions in the area of patent eligibility have caused significant
problems. First, the Court's decisions both reflect and have produced
considerable confusion.1 5 The Court, for example, confuses the
relevant policy concerns underlying existing statutory patent law
doctrines. In particular, the Court bases its patent eligibility doctrine
on policy concerns already and better addressed by other statutory
patent law doctrines.1 6 For example, while the Court is concerned
with the breadth of claims, that concern is already addressed by the
non-obviousness, written description, and enablement requirements. 7
Furthermore, while the Court is concerned with abstractness, that
concern is already addressed by the utility, written description, and
definiteness requirements, combined with the limit on functional
claiming.' 8 And while the Court is concerned with preemption of the
basic building blocks of human ingenuity, that concern is already
addressed by the enablement and written description requirements,
the limited terms of patents, and the statutory experimental use
exception.' 9 In short, given the existing statutory patent law doctrines,
the Court has identified no policy-based justification for an
independent, non-statutory patent eligibility requirement. In the
process, the Court has usurped Congress's role of crafting statutory
patentability requirements. 20 And the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) and the lower courts are left to wonder
exactly how to apply a doctrine based on a confused understanding of
the patent statute and the relevant policies.
Second, the Court has settled upon a test - the so-called Mayo two-
part test first articulated in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus
Laboratories, Inc. - that lacks administrability. 21 The first part of the
test asks whether a claimed invention is directed to a law of nature,
15 See David 0. Taylor, Confusing Patent Eligibility, 84 TENN. L. REv. 157, 158-59
(2017) (describing these problems with the current state of patent eligibility law).
16 See id.
7 See id.
1 See id. at 160.
19 See id.
20 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (authorizing Congress to pass laws "[t]o
promote the Progress of ... useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to . .. Inventors
the exclusive Right to their . . . Discoveries").
21 See Taylor, supra note 15, at 160-61 (discussing the test set forth in Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1297 (2012)).
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physical phenomenon, or abstract idea.22 But every invention is based
upon a law of nature, physical phenomenon, or abstract idea, and
determining whether an invention is "directed to" one of these
concepts is a subjective question given that the Supreme Court has
sanctioned ignoring the language used by inventors in their patent
claims.23 The second part of the test is even more problematic. It asks
whether something in a patent claim transforms the nature of the
claim into a patent-eligible application of the ineligible concept. The
Court has labeled this analysis as the search for an "inventive concept"
- a concept that sufficiently ensures that the patent in practice
amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the ineligible
concept itself.24 The problem is no one can agree upon what the
Supreme Court meant by "inventive concept," let alone what is an
"inventive concept." And, anyways, the test is purely subjective in that
it requires the determination of whether something "significantly
more" than an ineligible concept is present. As a result, the lower
courts are in disarray.25 In short, the Supreme Court has resurrected a
purely subjective test that the USPTO and courts cannot apply with
any predictability given its subjective nature.
Third, as a result of the first two problems, the Court's two-part test
has created a significant risk of reduced incentive to invent.26 Lower
courts' applications of the Mayo two-part test have unnecessarily
invalidated unworthy patent claims that the existing statutory
patentability requirements would invalidate. 27 More importantly,
however, lower courts have also invalidated claims - including
claims to potentially lifesaving inventions - that the statutory
patentability requirements would not invalidate.28 As a result, there is
a prevailing view that, because of the non-statutory exceptions to
patent eligibility, patents will not be available to protect worthy
22 See id. at 161.
23 See id. at 228-30.
24 See id. at 161.
25 See id. at 162, 236-40. Ironically, the search for an "inventive concept" - and
the level of subjectivity inherent in it - resembles the Supreme Court's old, discarded
search for an "invention." See id. at 231. Notably, in 1952 Congress replaced the
search for an "invention" with the question of whether one of ordinary skill in the art
to which the claimed invention pertains would regard the claimed invention as a
whole non-obvious given the differences between the claimed in invention and the
prior art. See id. at 232-33.
26 See id. at 162-63.
27 See id. at 240.
28 See id. at 236-38 (citing Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d
1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015)).
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inventions, and as a result individuals and companies may not invest
efficiently in research and development. Indeed, those espousing this
view include the former director of the USPTO, current and former
judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
and an overwhelming number of patent practitioners. 29
In short, while the Supreme Court has repeatedly focused on 35
U.S.C. § 101 and the eligibility requirement to the exclusion of the
other statutory requirements, the result is not pretty. Given all of the
problems associated with the two-part test for eligibility, it is apparent
that the Supreme Court has been unable to identify a workable
standard.
B. The Unlikelihood of the Supreme Court Reversing Course
Even if one recognizes all of the problems with the Supreme Court's
test for eligibility, before reaching the conclusion that Congress
should act to correct these problems, one should consider whether the
Court itself might reverse course. Indeed, as just shown, the Court is
obsessed with the question of patent eligibility, and so it seems likely
that the Court would grant certiorari in yet another case on point. But
granting review in another case does not necessarily mean that the
Court will reverse its precedent. So if the question is whether
Congress should wait for the Supreme Court to correct itself, the
answer lies in whether there is any reasonable chance that the Court
will reverse its precedent. 30 Unfortunately, it seems unlikely.
In Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International,3 ' the Court already
confronted urgent pleadings to clarify the two-part test it articulated in
Mayo.32 The petitioner, in particular, asked the Court to reject Mayo's
suggestion that it is appropriate to dissect claims to search for an
abstract idea given the resulting uncertainty.33 Amici similarly asked
29 See id. at 240-44.
30 For example, might the Court finally reach the conclusion that the appropriate
approach for patent eligibility is to focus on whether a claimed invention is the result
of human effort and a practical application of a natural law, physical phenomena, or
abstract idea? See id. at 212-21 (discussing these concepts).
31 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
32 See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294
(2012).
33 Brief for Petitioner at 53-54, Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. 2347 (No. 13-298) ("In
particular, lower courts have misinterpreted some of the Court's decisions -
particularly Flook and Mayo - to authorize a dissection of claims to search for an
abstract idea, vaguely defined, at their core. Such an approach is not just contrary to
this Court's case law and the statutory text. It is entirely unworkable . . . . Such
uncertainty imposes real costs on courts, litigants, innovators, and the broader
2017]1 2157
University of California, Davis
the Court to reject, in whole, the two-part test articulated in Mayo. As
just one example, former Federal Circuit Chief Judge Paul Michel's
amicus brief asked the Court to reject or at least clarify statements in
Mayo, return to the Court's traditional analysis in Diamond v. Diehr,34
and spurn any notion of adopting the Court's other approaches in
other cases.35
In Alice, however, the Court doubled down on Mayo.36 The Court
adopted Mayo's two-part test as the controlling test for all of the non-
statutory exceptions to patent eligibility. The Court first described
Mayo as "set[ting] forth a framework for distinguishing patents that
claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from
those that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts."37 The
Court then explained each part of the test in detail, quoting and citing
Mayo without any criticism.3 8 Only in a footnote did the Court meekly
attempt to explain how Mayo was consistent with Diehr.39 In the end,
the Court simply applied Mayo's two-part test.40
If in a future case the Court were to squarely address calls to reverse
its precedent, the Court would no doubt consider the doctrine of stare
decisis as a ground to continue use of the two-part test, even if that test
contradicts the Court's precedent and, ultimately, is wrong. Moreover,
it seems likely that the Court would rely upon stare decisis to reject
any argument for it to overturn its precedent on § 101.41 A recent
decision of the Supreme Court in a patent case shows why.
economy.... Indeed, the costs of the current confusion can be vividly seen in this
case.").
34 See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191-93 (1981).
35 See Brief for Paul R. Michel as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Alice
Corp., 134 S. Ct. 2347 (No. 13-298) ("Nor should the Court rely on statements in its
two recent life-science Section 101 cases Mayo v. Prometheus . . . and Ass'n For
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.... beyond those statements' applicable
bounds, lest they be applied in a manner that does not fit the realities of computer
technology.... [The Court should return to its seminal precedent in Diehr, a
computer case, which provides the best approach. Any recourse to the aberrational
approach of Flook or the unworkable notion of relative abstractness of Bilski will
complicate, confuse, and confound the patent law." (citations omitted)).
36 See Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2355.
37 Id.
38 See id.
39 Id. at 2355 n.3 ("Because the approach we made explicit in Mayo considers all
claim elements, both individually and in combination, it is consistent with the general
rule that patent claims 'must be considered as a whole."' (quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at
188)).
40 See id. at 2355-60.
41 While it has not relied upon the doctrine of stare decisis, the Court in Mayo did
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The Supreme Court's decision in Kimble v. Marvel Enterprises
provides guidance on the likelihood of its application of stare decisis in
the context of the law governing patent eligibility.42 In the case, the
Court considered whether to overturn its precedent holding that it is
patent misuse to require payments for a license to a patent where the
payments are based on use of the patented technology after the patent
has expired.43 The Court decided not to overturn its precedent based
on the doctrine of stare decisis.44 It did so despite overwhelming legal
and economic literature indicating that its precedent is unequivocally
wrong.45
The Court began its analysis by highlighting that reversal of its
precedent required "a 'special justification' - over and above the
belief 'that the precedent was wrongly decided."' 46 "What is more,"
noted the Court, "stare decisis carries enhanced force when a
decision . . . interprets a statute." 47 The Court explained that it would
apply statutory stare decisis even when a decision has
announced a "judicially created doctrine" designed to
implement a federal statute. All our interpretive decisions, in
whatever way reasoned, effectively become part of the
statutory scheme, subject (just like the rest) to congressional
change. Absent special justification, they are balls tossed into
Congress's court, for acceptance or not as that branch elects.48
Thus, special justification is needed to overturn any interpretation of a
federal statute.
But even more than the "special justification" needed to be shown in
the context of the facts in Kimble; "superspecial" justification needed
to be shown for three additional reasons. 49 First, the Court pointed to
the fact that its prior case interpreted a statute rather than the
note that an argument presented by the government - that the other sections of the
patent statute adequately protect the public from the problems associated with the
claims at issue in the case - were "not consistent with prior law." See Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1303 (2012).
42 See generally Kimble v. Marvel Entm't, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015).
3 See id. at 2406.
4 See id.
45 See id. at 2412 ("A broad scholarly consensus supports Kimble's view of the
competitive effects of post-expiration royalties, and we see no error in that shared
analysis.").
46 Id. at 2409.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 See id. at 2410.
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Constitution.50 Second, the Court highlighted the fact that "Congress
ha[d] spurned multiple opportunities to reverse" the relevant
precedent despite multiple opportunities to do so over a half century.5 1
Third, the Court explained that cases involving property and contract
rights favor stare decisis in particular "because parties are especially
likely to rely on such precedents when ordering their affairs" and
reversing course would "upset expectations." 52
The Court found no "superspecial" justification in the relevant
circumstances to overrule its precedent for the following reasons.
First, the "statutory and doctrinal underpinnings [of the precedent]
ha[d] not eroded over time."5 3 Second, "nothing about [the precedent]
had proved unworkable."54 Third, the precedent in question was not
an interpretation of antitrust law but instead patent law, and therefore
did not fall within the category of antitrust cases in which the Court
had "viewed stare decisis as having less-than-usual force."55 Fourth,
the precedent in question did not "hinge on the mistake Kimble
identifies," the mistaken economic claim "that post-patent royalties
harm competition."5 6 Fifth, the Court rejected the argument that stare
decisis allowed for overturning its precedent based on the "the
wellspring of all patent policy: the goal of promoting innovation." 57
Based on all of these considerations, it seems unlikely that the
Supreme Court would reverse course in the area of patent eligibility.
The Court's patent eligibility cases hinge on the interpretation of a
statutory section, § 101, that Congress has not yet amended. Thus,
their reversal at least requires special justification. Moreover,
"superspecial" justification may be needed. On the one hand,
Congress has similarly "spurned multiple opportunities" to reverse the
"true origin of inventive application as a test for patent eligibility,"5
the case of Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co. 59 That case was
50 See id. at 2409.
5' Id.
52 Id. at 2410.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 2411.
55 Id. at 2412.
56 Id. at 2413.
57 Id. at 2414.
58 Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Inventive Application: A History, 67 FLA. L. REV. 565, 624
(2015) ("The true origin of inventive application as a test for patent eligibility was
Justice Douglas's opinion in Funk Brothers.").
59 Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 132 (1948) ("The
application of this newly-discovered natural principle to the problem of packaging of
inoculants may well have been an important commercial advance. But once nature's
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decided in 1948, and Congress has amended the patent statute several
times since then without overturning its holding.60 On the other hand,
the Court's recent decision in Mayo somewhat resurrects the bad law
from Funk and Parker v. Flook,61 which Diehr seemed to displace. 62
Also, patent eligibility cases do not involve contracts rights in the
same manner as Kimble. The Supreme Court's decisions on patent
eligibility affect inventors and users of technology. Inventors would
not be adversely affected by a change in the law to the extent they
have decided not to invent given Mayo and Alice. Users of technology,
however, might cry foul based on their reliance on the Court's
decisions on patent eligibility to order their affairs. In particular, users
of technology may have decided to use certain technology on the basis
of belief that the two-part test articulated in Mayo and Alice renders
certain patent claims invalid.
Regardless of whether special or "superspecial" justification is
needed to overturn Mayo and Alice, there is significant doubt that the
secret of the non-inhibitive quality of certain strains of the species of Rhizobium was
discovered, the state of the art made the production of a mixed inoculant a simple
step. Even though it may have been the product of skill, it certainly was not the
product of invention."). Since 1948, Congress has twice amended the patent statute in
substantial ways. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No 112-29, 125 Stat.
284 (2011); Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 593, Hi 1-293, 66 Stat. 797 (1952)
(current version at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376). Neither time did Congress expressly overrule
Funk Bros.
60 See, e.g., Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284
(2011); American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat.
1501 (1999).
61 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
62 Compare Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289,
1294, 1304 (2012) ("Those cases ... insist that a process that focuses upon the use of a
natural law also contain other elements or a combination of elements, sometimes
referred to as an 'inventive concept,' sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice
amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the natural law itself . . . We
recognize that, in evaluating the significance of additional steps, the § 101 patent-
eligibility inquiry and, say, the § 102 novelty inquiry might sometimes overlap."),
Flook, 437 U.S. at 594 ("Even though a phenomenon of nature or mathematical
formula may be well known, an inventive application of the principle may be patented.
Conversely, the discovery of such a phenomenon cannot support a patent unless there
is some other inventive concept in its application."), and Funk, 333 U.S. at 131 ("But a
product must be more than new and useful to be patented; it must also satisfy the
requirements of invention or discovery."), with Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 193
n.15 (1981) ("In order for the dissent to reach its conclusion it is necessary for it to
read out of respondents' patent application all the steps in the claimed process which it
determined were not novel or 'inventive.' That is not the purpose of the § 101 inquiry
and conflicts with the proposition recited above that a claimed invention may be
entitled to patent protection even though some or all of its elements are not 'novel."').
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Supreme Court would find the relevant hurdle cleared. Pointing in the
direction of stare decisis stands the fact that the statutory and doctrinal
underpinnings of Mayo and Alice have not eroded over time. In
particular, Congress has not rewritten § 101 and the Court has not
overturned any of its patent eligibility precedent. Furthermore, the
precedent in question was an interpretation of patent law, not antitrust
law. Moreover, the Court is unresponsive to arguments based on the
goal of promoting invention and innovation. Pointing in the direction
of overturning the Court's precedent, by contrast, stands the fact that
everything about the Court's precedent has proven unworkable; as I
have shown, the two-part test simply is not administrable.63 In
addition, recent scholarship has highlighted that one of the primary
bases for the Court's approach in this area - the old case of Neilson v.
Harford - in fact condemns the Court's approach.64 In short, while
some factors favor allowing the Court to reverse its precedent on
patent eligibility, more favor the application of stare decisis. And given
the Court's aggressive application of stare decisis in Kimble, it seems
unlikely that the Court would reverse its precedent in the area of
patent eligibility.
But the Court would have to grant a petition for certiorari to even
reach the question of whether the two-part test set forth in Mayo and
Alice should be overturned. And recently the Court denied certiorari in
a case in which the Federal Circuit judges practically cried out for
guidance on how to apply the two-part test set forth in Mayo and Alice.
In Ariosa v. Sequenom,65 a Federal Circuit panel applied the Mayo
two-part test to invalidate claims to an invention for "prenatal
diagnosis of fetal DNA that avoids the risks of widely-used techniques
that took samples from the fetus or placenta." 66 In an opinion
concurring in the panel decision, Judge Linn noted that he joined the
court's opinion only because he felt "bound by the sweeping language
of the test set out in Mayo."67 He pointed out that "the breadth of the
second part of the test was unnecessary to the decision reached in
Mayo."68 After highlighting the importance of the invention - citing
evidence that the invention was "groundbreaking" and represented a
"paradigm shift" - and explaining how the claims would traditionally
be found eligible, Judge Linn remarked that, "[blut for the sweeping
63 See Taylor, supra note 15, at 227-35.
64 See, e.g., Lefstin, supra note 58, at 570.
65 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
66 Id. at 1373.




language in the Supreme Court's Mayo opinion," he could "see no
reason, in policy or statute, why this breakthrough invention should
be deemed patent ineligible." 69 Thus, Judge Linn essentially asked the
Supreme Court to explain either why this claimed invention should
not be eligible for patenting, or how under the Mayo two-part test it
could be found eligible. Likewise, in response to a motion for en banc
rehearing, other judges on the Federal Circuit similarly cried out for
the Supreme Court to provide more guidance in terms of how to apply
the Mayo two-part test to provide appropriate incentives for
inventors.70
Despite the Federal Circuit judges' desperate pleas - and twenty-
two amicus briefs in favor of certiorari compared to none opposing it
- the Supreme Court denied the petition.7' Beyond its denial of
certiorari in this important case, however, there are two additional
signs of just how out of touch the Supreme Court remains with
respect to its patent eligibility jurisprudence. First, the Court did not
even request the Solicitor General's view on whether it should grant or
deny certiorari, an increasingly common practice and one clearly
justified in view of the Federal Circuit judges' views and the
overwhelming, unanimous amici support for a grant of certiorari.
Second, on the same day the Court denied certiorari in Ariosa v.
Sequenom, it granted certiorari in another relatively unimportant
69 Id. at 1381.
70 See Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 809 F.3d 1282, 1287 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (Lourie, J., concurring in the denial of the petition for en banc rehearing, joined
by Moore, J.) ("In sum, it is unsound to have a rule that takes inventions of this
nature out of the realm of patent-eligibility on grounds that they only claim a natural
phenomenon plus conventional steps, or that they claim abstract concepts. But I agree
that the panel did not err in its conclusion that under Supreme Court precedent it had
no option other than to affirm the district court."); id. at 1293 (Newman, J., dissenting
from the denial of en banc rehearing) ("I agree with my colleagues that this case is
wrongly decided. However, I do not share their view that this incorrect decision is
required by Supreme Court precedent. .. . In Mayo ... the Court recognized the
principle that patent eligibility is not disabled when science is put to practical
use . . . ."); id. at 1287 (Dyk, J., concurring in the denial of en banc rehearing) ("In my
view the framework of Mayo and Alice is an essential ingredient of a healthy patent
system, allowing the invalidation of improperly issued and highly anticompetitive
patents without the need for protracted and expensive litigation. Yet I share the
concerns of some of my colleagues that a too restrictive test for patent eligibility under
35 U.S.C. § 101 with respect to laws of nature (reflected in some of the language in
Mayo) may discourage development and disclosure of new diagnostic and therapeutic
methods in the life sciences, which are often driven by discovery of new natural laws
and phenomena.").
71 See Sequenom, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 2511 (2016) (mem.)
(denial of certiorari).
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patent case - one addressing a narrow issue of the proper
interpretation of the statutory section governing a rare form of
infringement, infringement by exportation.72 In short, the Supreme
Court has signaled that it is unwilling or unable to solve the crisis of
confusion, lack of administrability, and reduced incentive to invent
that its jurisprudence has created.
C. Constitutionality of Amending § 101
Another important question - beyond whether Congress should
wait for the Supreme Court to correct this area of the law - is
whether Congress has the authority to amend the patent statute to
overturn any of the Supreme Court's decisions on patent eligibility. In
particular, one must ask whether Congress may overturn the judicially
created non-statutory exceptions to eligibility, or if instead whether
any such attempt would be unconstitutional.
The Constitution, of course, grants to Congress the power to craft a
patent statute that promotes the progress of the useful arts by
providing exclusive rights in discoveries to inventors for limited time
periods.73 But the Supreme Court might confront an argument one day
that Congress passed an unconstitutional amendment to the Patent
Act when it overruled the Court's precedent in favor of expanded
patent eligibility. Congress overstepped its bounds, so the argument
would go, because by expanding eligibility Congress impeded rather
than promoted the progress of the useful arts.
The Supreme Court has stated that the constitutional provision in
question is "both a grant of power and a limitation." 7 In terms of how
the provision limits the power of Congress, the Court has explained
that Congress may not
enlarge the patent monopoly without regard to the innovation,
advancement or social benefit gained thereby. Moreover,
Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose
effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public
domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available.
Innovation, advancement, and things which add to the sum of
useful knowledge are inherent requisites in a patent system
72 See Life Techs. Corp. v. Promega Corp., 773 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2014), cert.
granted, (June 27, 2016) (No. 14-1538).
7 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (authorizing Congress to pass laws "[t]o promote
the Progress of ... useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to .. . Inventors the
exclusive Right to their ... Discoveries").
7 Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966).
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which by constitutional command must 'promote the Progress
of ... useful Arts.' This is the standard expressed in the
Constitution and it may not be ignored.7 5
Congress must ensure that any legislation addressing the non-
statutory exceptions, including any legislation amending § 101,
complies with these restrictions. In particular, any such legislation
must have social utility by encouraging the creation and disclosure of
inventions that add to the "sum of useful knowledge," and conversely
must not remove existent knowledge from the public domain or
restrict free access to materials already available.
In terms of how the provision empowers Congress, the Court has
likewise explained:
Within the limits of the constitutional grant, the Congress
may, of course, implement the stated purpose of the Framers
by selecting the policy which in its judgment best effectuates
the constitutional aim. This is but a corollary to the grant to
Congress of any Article I power. Within the scope established
by the Constitution, Congress may set out conditions and tests
for patentability. 76
Thus, Congress has broad power to select the policy that in its view
best promotes the progress of the useful arts, and to set forth statutory
conditions and requirements for patentability consistent with its view
of the best policy.
Given this broad power given to Congress under the Constitution to
fashion the conditions and requirements of patentability, the Supreme
Court would likely defer to Congress and find legislation clarifying,
and perhaps even eliminating, the non-statutory exceptions to be
constitutional. Indeed, in Kimble the Court repeatedly highlighted that
it is the role of Congress to correct the Supreme Court's mistakes in
statutory interpretation and determination of patent policy.' 7 While
the Court ultimately decided not to reverse its precedent related to
patent misuse law based on the doctrine of stare decisis, in this context
the Court explained why Congress has the power to overturn the
75 Id. at 6.
76 Id. (citations omitted).
77 See, e.g., Kimble v. Marvel Entm't, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2409 (2015) ("All our
interpretive decisions, in whatever way reasoned, effectively become part of the
statutory scheme, subject (just like the rest) to congressional change. Absent special
justification, they are balls tossed into Congress's court, for acceptance or not as that
branch elects."); id. at 2414 ("ITihe choice of what patent policy should be lies first
and foremost with Congress.").
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Court's precedent.78 Thus, the Court's reasoning in Kimble is highly
relevant to any challenge to an amendment to the patent statute to
overturn the Court's precedent interpreting the patent statute.
So, what was the Court's reasoning? The Court explained that, "[b]y
contrast with the Sherman Act, the patent laws do not turn over
exceptional law-shaping authority to the courts." 79 It went on to say
that "[cilaims that a statutory precedent has 'serious and harmful
consequences' for innovation are (to repeat this opinion's refrain)
'more appropriately addressed to Congress."'80 In more detail, it
explained:
That branch, far more than this one, has the capacity to assess
Kimble's charge that Brulotte suppresses technological
progress. And if it concludes that Brulotte works such harm,
Congress has the prerogative to determine the exact right
response - choosing the policy fix, among many conceivable
ones, that will optimally serve the public interest.81
By simultaneously adhering to its precedent and deferring to
Congress, the Court claimed it would "promote the rule-of-law values
to which courts must attend while leaving matters of public policy to
Congress." 82 And, finally, in the end the Court conclusively stated that
"the choice of what patent policy should be lies first and foremost with
Congress."83
While there is a significant question whether the Court was correct
when it proclaimed that the patent misuse doctrine is "statutory
precedent," 84 the Court would likely view its precedent in the area of
patent eligibility as "statutory precedent." In these cases, the Court has
repeatedly explained that it derives the judicial exceptions from the
statutory text of § 101.85 The Court, by contrast, has not couched its
78 See id. at 2409, 2412-14.
79 Id. at 2413.





84 Id. at 2415 (Alito, J., dissenting) ("Brulotte was ... a bald act of policymaking. It
was not simply a case of incorrect statutory interpretation. It was not really statutory
interpretation at all."). For a discussion of whether the Court's eligibility precedent is
"a bald act of policymaking," see infra Part III.C.
85 See, e.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) ("We have




subject matter eligibility cases as addressing matters of constitutional
interpretation rather than statutory interpretation.86 Thus, with
respect to efforts to amend the patent statute to expand eligibility,
Kimble is helpful. It signals the probability that the Court will defer to
Congress with respect to any codification or overruling of Supreme
Court precedent related to patent eligibility. Thus, while it is likely
that the Supreme Court would rely upon stare decisis to reject any
argument for the Court to overturn its precedent on § 101, it
simultaneously is likely that it would defer to Congress to the extent
Congress adopts another standard or weighs the competing policies
differently.
Moreover, the Court's opinion in Kimble explicitly ties its analysis in
the context of its precedent on patent misuse to its precedent on
eligible subject matter. Indeed, in dicta the Court went out of its way
to highlight these points in the very context of its precedent applying
"subject matter limits" to patenting, when Kimble itself did not relate
to subject matter eligibility.87 The Court states that it has "carefully
guarded [the] cut-off date, just as it has the patent law's subject matter
limits: In case after case, the Court has construed those laws to
preclude measures that restrict free access to formerly patented, as
well as unpatentable, inventions."88 While dicta, this language
highlights that, like the court's precedent on patent misuse, the court's
precedent on eligible subject matter is a matter of statutory
interpretation based on the Court's view of the governing policies. In
86 While the Court has not referred expressly to the Constitution in this context,
the closest the Court has come is probably in Mayo, where it referred to the purpose of
promoting innovation:
'Phenomena of nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and
abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of
scientific and technological work.' And monopolization of those tools
through the grant of a patent might tend to impede innovation more than it
would tend to promote it.
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012)
(quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Innovation is not exactly the
purpose of patent law, however. Patent law seeks to promote invention - the creation
of new technology - and not necessarily innovation - the use of new technology.
See generally, e.g., Cont'1 Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429-30
(1908) (finding no requirement to practice or license a patented invention). And
anyway the Court's interpretation of § 101 is not needed to address the Court's
concerns with "the basic tools of scientific and technological work." See Taylor, supra
note 15, at 190, 212-21.
87 Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2407.
88 Id. (emphasis added).
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other words, just as in Kimble with respect to patent misuse law,
however carefully the Court has guarded eligibility, the exact content
of the law guarding eligibility is a matter of policy that is first the
responsibility of Congress.
Other Supreme Court opinions more clearly make the case that
eligibility law is a question of policy appropriately directed to
Congress. In Gottschalk v. Benson, for example, the Court noted that
"considerable problems are raised" by the prospect of eligibility for
computer programs, "which only committees of Congress can manage,
for broad powers of investigation are needed, including hearings
which canvass the wide variety of views which those operating in this
field entertain." 89 Now, as then, "considered action by the Congress is
needed." 90 In like fashion, the Court in Parker v. Flook stated that
"[d]ifficult questions of policy concerning the kinds of programs that
may be appropriate for patent protection . . . can be answered by
Congress on the basis of current empirical data not equally available to
this tribunal." 91 More recently, in Mayo the Court highlighted its belief
that it is "the role of Congress in crafting more finely tailored rules
where necessary" such that the Court did not need to "determine here
whether, from a policy perspective, increased protection for
discoveries of diagnostic laws of nature is desirable." 92 Similarly, in
Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., the Court
rebuffed the argument that it should consider the reliance interest of
patent owners based on USPTO determinations of eligibility; it
indicated that "[c]oncerns about reliance interests arising from PTO
determinations, insofar as they are relevant, are better directed to
Congress."93
If Congress acted upon these statements and passed legislation
overruling (as opposed to codifying or clarifying) the Supreme Court's
two-part test for eligibility, however, the Court might still be called
upon to decide whether that legislation was unconstitutional. An
important consideration in this regard is that any argument that a
statutory amendment to § 101 (or another form of legislation
eliminating or modifying the current non-statutory exceptions) is
unconstitutional would have to prove that the entire patent statute, not
just § 101, is unconstitutional. Congress has not decreed that any claim
89 Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 73.
90 Id.
91 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 595 (1978).
92 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1305 (2012).




that complies with the eligibility requirement of § 101 must issue in a
patent. No, by its very terms § 101 requires compliance, not just with
the subject matter and utility requirements articulated in § 101, but also
with the other "conditions and requirements of this title."9 4
The patent statute includes many patentability and specification
requirements. 95 Any challenge to the constitutionality of legislation
eliminating the non-statutory exceptions would have to analyze
whether the combination of all of these requirements (subject matter,
utility, novelty, non-obviousness, written description, enablement, the
limitation on functional claiming, and definiteness) fail to bar patents
from issuing to unworthy patent applicants, such that it is clear that
those patents do not promote the progress of discovery in the useful
arts but instead impede that progress. Unfortunately, what might have
led to the present state of the law governing eligibility is the fact that
the Supreme Court repeatedly confronts cases where the only question
it is tasked with answering is the correct application of its case law
applying the non-statutory exceptions excluding laws of nature,
physical phenomena, and abstract ideas from patenting.96 In the face
of a constitutional challenge, by contrast, the Court would not be able
to avoid consideration of all of the statutory doctrines that already
address concerns with the ability to claim laws of nature, physical
phenomena, and abstract ideas.
In this regard, it is important to recognize the problem with the
related arguments made by perhaps the most frequent and animated
judicial supporter of the Supreme Court's approach to § 101, Senior
Circuit Judge Mayer of the Federal Circuit. He makes several
arguments in support of a central role in the analysis of patent claims
for § 101 and, in particular, the Supreme Court's law on eligibility.
First, he criticizes "the view that section 101 is a 'coarse eligibility
filter' and that other patent validity requirements - such as novelty,
non-obviousness, and adequate written description - should be used
to weed out patents of dubious quality." 97 He argues that the other
patentability requirements have, "as a practical matter, proved
woefully inadequate in preventing a deluge of very poor quality
patents." 98 Second, as a matter of precedent he cites recent Supreme
94 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
95 See Taylor, supra note 15, at 186-88.
96 See Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1303 ("The relevant cases rest their holdings upon
section 101, not later sections.").
97 MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn Corp., 672 F.3d 1250, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Mayer,
J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
98 Id.; see also id. ("[T]here is no evidence that relying on §§ 102, 103, or 112 will
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Court opinions as justification for a robust application of § 101.99
Third, and most relevant here, he concludes that "[a] robust
application of section 101 is required to ensure that the patent laws
comport with their constitutionally-defined objective."10 0
Judge Mayer's arguments fail to prove that § 101, in particular, must
be - to use his metaphor - a "fine eligibility filter" that alone ensures
that no "poor quality patents" issue. 101 In any particular case, a judge
cannot conclude that a non-statutory exception is necessary let alone
required by the Constitution unless that judge has analyzed every other
statutory requirement - and the evidence relevant to compliance with
those requirements - and concluded that those requirements fail to
exclude an unworthy claim from issuance. Judge Mayer, in particular,
has not expressly made this analysis in the cases where he has made
sweeping conclusions regarding the necessity of the non-statutory
exceptions. 102 Nor has he identified any independent purpose of the
non-statutory exceptions in terms of policy, let alone any particular
failings of interpretations or applications of existing patentability and
specification requirements to meet the objectives of those policies. He
has made only generalized criticisms of "poor patent quality,"103 which
does not help advance the cause of identifying particular problems
with the existing statutory law, let alone solving them. Moreover, it is
not a sufficient argument, in terms of a policy debate at least, to point
to the Supreme Court's confusing precedent. And, anyway, even if it is
true that the statutory patentability requirements are not working
based on some preferred policy goal, problems with those
requirements ought to be addressed and corrected directly - whether
through better interpretations of the existing statutory language or by
amending the relevant statutory language.
In short, in view of all of the problems with the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence on the issue of patent eligibility, the time has come for
solve the problem [of poor quality business method and software patents]. This claim
was made ten years ago. It is still being made now. At what point does this argument
run out of credibility?" (quotation marks and footnote call number omitted) (quoting
Gerard N. Magliocca, Patenting the Curve Ball: Business Methods and Industry Norms,
2009 BYU L. REV. 875, 900)).
99 See id. at 1268-69.
100 Id. at 1269 (emphasis added).
10 See id. at 1268 (criticizing those who "take the view that section 101 is a 'coarse
eligibility filter"'); see also Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 720 (Fed.
Cir. 2014) (Mayer, J., concurring).
102 See OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(Mayer, J., concurring); Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 718; MySpace, 672 F.3d at 1269.
103 MySpace, 672 F.3d at 1268.
2170 [Vol. 50:2149
Amending Patent Eligibility
Congress to consider overturning the Court's approach in this area.
Given the doctrine of stare decisis, it is unlikely that the Supreme
Court will resolve the confusion it has created and put in place an
administrable test for eligibility. As a result, and given its broad
constitutional authority, Congress should do so; it should seek to
provide greater clarity regarding the appropriate policies governing
eligibility and the statutory patentability requirements, to provide
administrable tests to further those policies, and to maintain the
incentive patent law provides for potential inventors and their
supporters to invest in the acts of invention - research and
development. Such legislation would not likely violate the
Constitution; 0 4 instead it would reflect Congress taking responsibility
to fine tune the patent statute to ensure that appropriate statutory
patent law doctrines "promote the Progress of ... useful Arts." 05
II. RECOGNIZING THE ABILITY OF NON-ELIGIBILITY DOCTRINES TO
ADDRESS RELEVANT CONCERNS
Once convinced of the appropriateness of legislative action to
resolve the existing problems with the Supreme Court's approach to
patent eligibility, Congress should consider whether the existing
statutory patentability and specification requirements sufficiently
address the relevant concerns raised by the Supreme Court. Those
other patentability and specification requirements do already, without
amendment address those concerns. But even if they do not do so
sufficiently, the appropriate step is for Congress to consider amending
those requirements rather than perpetuate unnecessary non-statutory
exceptions to eligibility. An independent eligibility requirement would
be necessary only if there is some independent policy basis for it. In
other words, Congress should confront the preliminary question of
whether the patentability and specification requirements need
104 For another perspective on the issue of the constitutionality of legislation
overruling the Supreme Court on the issue of the non-statutory exceptions, see
Hayden W. Gregory, Patent Eligibility: Should Congress Overrule the Supreme Court's
Recent Decisions? Would the Court Overrule the Overrule?, 7 LANDSLIDE 1, 65 (2015)
("Should Congress decide to depart from th[e] tradition [of not adding statutory
requirements for patentability] and no longer leave 'wide latitude for judicial
construction,' the Court's precedents allow it wide latitude for decision, ranging from
confirmation as an exercise of Congress's legislative authority to rejection as an act in
excess of its constitutional power.").
105 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (authorizing Congress to pass laws "[tlo promote
the Progress of . .. useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the
exclusive Right to their . . . Discoveries").
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amendment. Congress should perform this analysis before deciding
whether there is an independent basis for a separate eligibility
requirement and, if so, what that requirement should address.
A. The Ability of Existing Requirements to Address Relevant Concerns
The Supreme Court has twice explicitly rejected the idea that the
patent statute, rather than the non-statutory exceptions to eligible
subject matter, already address the Court's concerns. 106 In both
instances, however, the Court was wrong.
In Parker v. Flook, the court rejected the argument that its approach
"improperly imports into § 101 the consideration of 'inventiveness'
which are the proper concerns of H§ 102 and 103."107 It did so based
on two alleged "fundamental misconceptions."10 8 Describing the first
"fundamental misconception," the Court rejected the position that "if
a process application implements a principle in some specific fashion,
it automatically falls within the patentable subject matter of § 101."109
This is not so, according to the Court, for three reasons. The Court
said it is inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent.1'0 The Court
held it would "make the determination of patentable subject matter
depend simply on the draftsman's art."111 And the Court stated it
"would ill serve the principles underlying the prohibition against
patents for 'ideas' or phenomena of nature." 112
None of these three arguments regarding the first "fundamental
misconception"1 13 holds water. First, § 101, and in particular the
utility requirement, exactly requires the claim to cover a specific
implementation of a principle; this is the requirement of a practical
application."4 Not only is the requirement of a practical application
106 See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1303
(2012); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 592-94 (1978).
107 Flook, 437 U.S. at 592.
108 Id.




113 Id. at 592.
114 Several old Supreme Court cases support the idea that § 101 requires only a
practical application, meaning some specific implementation, of an idea. See, e.g., Le Roy
v. Tatham, 63 U.S. 132, 135-36 (1859) ("A patent will be good, though the subject of the
patent consists in the discovery of a great, general, and most comprehensive principle in
science or law of nature, if that principle is, by the specification, applied to any special
purpose, so as thereby to effectuate a practical result and benefit not previously
attained."); Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 268 (1853) ("It is for the discovery or
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not inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent, it is exactly
consistent with some of the earliest Supreme Court and English
precedent on point. Consider, for example, the Supreme Court's
decision in Le Roy v. Tatham in 1859, which included the following
quote from the English decision in Househill Co. v. Neilson from 1843:
A patent will be good, though the subject of the patent
consists in the discovery of a great, general, and most
comprehensive principle in science or law of nature, if that
principle is, by the specification, applied to any special
purpose, so as thereby to effectuate a practical result and
benefit not previously attained. 115
These cases cannot more clearly contradict the Supreme Court's
rejection of the requirement of a practical application for purposes of
patent eligibility. Indeed, later Supreme Court cases cited in the
Court's decision in Flook in 1978 (primarily Funk from 1948)
contradict this early Supreme Court and English precedent to the
extent they require an "inventive application" rather than merely a
practical application of the underlying principle for purposes of patent
eligibility. 116
Second, the argument that a focus on whether the claim describes a
practical application of a natural law would cause the determination of
eligibility to depend on the "draftsman's art"11 ' is exactly backwards.
The Supreme Court should not blame patent prosecutors for
attempting to draft claims that pass muster under patent eligibility
law. That is exactly what Congress and the Supreme Court should
want patent prosecutors to do; they should want them to draft claims
that comply with eligibility law. At the same time, they should expect
them to exploit any loopholes in eligibility law. The Supreme Court
seems to view patent prosecutors as the personification of Justice
Holmes' "bad [men],"118 without appreciating why they should be
viewed that way. Justice Holmes's idea was that the law should be
invention of some practicable method or means of producing a beneficial result or effect,
that a patent is granted, and not for the result or effect itself. . . . But it is well settled that
a man cannot have a patent for the function or abstract effect of a machine, but only for
the machine which produces it.").
15 Le Roy, 63 U.S. at 135-36 (quoting Househill Co. v. Neilson, Webster's Patent
Cases, 683).
116 Lefstin, supra note 58, at 570 ("It was not until 1948, when the Supreme Court
decided Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., that a test of inventive
application entered the mainstream of American patent law.").
i1 See Flook, 437 U.S. at 593.
118 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 H-ARv. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897).
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viewed from the perspective of a bad man - a man who cares not
about right or wrong but instead only about the consequences of his
actions under the law.11 9 But the purpose of viewing the law from the
perspective of a bad man is to understand the law and its ability to
conform the behavior of the bad man to good ends.120 The bad man's
behavior is changed by calibrating the legal consequences, not by
relying on the bad man's inherent appreciation of right or wrong or
good policy. In the context of patent law, then, we should ask: how
would a patent prosecutor - who cares nothing about encouraging
investment in efforts to invent, advancing public understanding of
technology, or ensuring that the basic tools of science remain in the
public domain, but instead only about his and his client's bottom line
- draft a claim given the law of eligibility and the consequences for
not complying with that law?121
In this regard, the Supreme Court's criticism of the claim drafting of
patent prosecutors sounds like criticism of corporate attorneys who
exploit tax loopholes. In that field, until recently attempts to exploit
loopholes were viewed as a "legitimate point-and-counterpoint that
more involved a thwarting of tax avoidance than serious tax
evasion."1 22 Furthermore, the Supreme Court's proverbial finger
119 See id. at 458 ("One of the many evil effects of the confusion between legal and
moral ideas, about which I shall have something to say in a moment, is that theory is
apt to get the cart before the horse, and to consider the right or the duty as something
existing apart from and independent of the consequences of its breach, to which
certain sanctions are added afterward. But, as I shall try to show, a legal duty so called
is nothing but a prediction that if a man does or omits certain things he will be made
to suffer in this or that way by judgment of the court; - and so of a legal right."); id.
at 459 ("If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad
man, who cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge enables
him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct, whether inside
the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience.").
120 See id. at 459. See generally Marco Jimenez, Finding the Good in Holmes's Bad
Man, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2069 (2011).
121 Interestingly, the recent criticism of patent prosecutors stands in stark contrast
with the historical recognition of the difficult task of drafting patent claims and the
implicit respect for successful completion of the task. Indeed, in a different era - the
late nineteenth century - the Supreme Court expressly recognized that "[tihe
specification and claims of a patent, particularly if the invention be at all complicated,
constitute one of the most difficult legal instruments to draw with accuracy." Topliff
v. Topliff, 145 U.S. 156, 171 (1892). While the difficulty the Court referred to then
reflected the complexity of the technology, ("particularly if the invention be at all
complicated"), the difficulty also reflects the complexity and uncertainty of the
underlying law, including the law governing patent eligibility. Id.
122 Richard J. Kovach, Taxes, Loopholes and Morals Revisited: A 1963 Perspective on
the Tax Gap, 30 WHITTIER L. REv. 247, 276 (2008) (describing the cycle of "opening
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pointed at patent prosecutors reminds one of the old saying, "when
you point a finger at someone, you always have three fingers pointed
at yourself." If there are loopholes in eligibility law, then the Supreme
Court - or better yet, as I have discussed, Congress - should close
the undesirable ones, just as tax regulators do. This would involve
applying or amending the statutory patentability requirements.
Tax law, like patent law, has at least one common law doctrine that
deals with the problem of exploitation of tax loopholes: the step
transaction doctrine, which "is a judicial manifestation of the more
general tax law ideal that effect should be given to the substance,
rather than the form, of a transaction, 'by ignoring for tax purposes,
steps of an integrated transaction that separately are without
substance."' 123 Likewise, the Supreme Court has said in patent cases
that the substance of the patent claim governs, not necessarily its
form. Interestingly, originally the Court said this to justify broad
rights in a patent - to find infringement when someone appropriated
an invention but made minor changes to it.124 Only later did the Court
distinguish between form and substance to eliminate patent rights
using the doctrine of patent eligibility.125 In distinguishing between
and closing [tax] loopholes" as viewed historically as a "legitimate point-and-
counterpoint that more involved a thwarting of tax avoidance than serious tax
evasion" by "taxpayers and their advisers, who would ceaselessly attempt to extract
loopholes from existing rules while regulators tirelessly attempt to alter or create rules
to block such attempts").
123 Falconwood Corp. v. United States, 422 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(quoting Dietzsch v. United States, 498 F.2d 1344, 1346 (Ct. Cl. 1974)).
124 See Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330, 343 (1853) ("Where form and substance
are inseparable, it is enough to look at the form only. Where they are separable; where
the whole substance of the invention may be copied in a different form, it is the duty
of courts and juries to look through the form for the substance of the invention - for
that which entitled the inventor to his patent, and which the patent was designed to
secure; where that is found, there is an infringement; and it is not a defence, that it is
embodied in a form not described, and in terms claimed by the patentee."). In Winans,
the reference to the substance of the invention meant that the invention received
broad protection. See id. ("The exclusive right to the thing patented is not secured, if
the public are at liberty to make substantial copies of it, varying its form or
proportions. And, therefore, the patentee, having described his invention, and shown
its principles, and claimed it in that form which most perfectly embodies it, is, in
contemplation of law, deemed to claim every form in which his invention may be
copied, unless he manifests an intention to disclaim some of those forms.").
125 See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978) ("The notion that post-solution
activity, no matter how conventional or obvious in itself, can transform an
unpatentable principle into a patentable process exalts form over substance. A
competent draftsman could attach some form of post-solution activity to almost any
mathematical formula; the Pythagorean theorem would not have been patentable, or
partially patentable, because a patent application contained a final step indicating that
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form and substance in the context of patent eligibility, the Court has
effectively discounted or ignored conventional elements in patent
claims.1 26
Of course the substance of the patent claim - which I take to mean
how the claimed invention is different from what is in nature or what
is in the prior art - does matter; these really are the exact concerns of
the novelty and non-obviousness requirements. As discussed,
moreover, the substance of the claim is also important for the
determination of infringement.127 But the form of a patent claim, not
just its substance, also is an important concern. The form of the claim
- every word in the claim - matters, for example, because the
language of the claim identifies how to determine whether there is
invalidity and infringement. Anticipation and infringement, for
example, require finding every element of the claim in the prior art or
the accused process or method, respectively.128 Language in the claim
likewise determines whether infringement occurs when a method is
performed, or instead when a device is made, used, sold, or offered for
sale.1 29 Language in the claim similarly determines whether the on-sale
bar results in invalidity when either a method has been performed or a
the formula, when solved, could be usefully applied to existing surveying
techniques.").
126 See id.; Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289,
1294 (2012) ("In particular, the steps in the claimed processes (apart from the natural
laws themselves) involve well-understood, routine, conventional activity previously
engaged in by researchers in the field."). But see Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S.
Ct. 2347, 2355 n.3 (2014) ("Because the approach we made explicit in Mayo considers
all claim elements, both individually and in combination, it is consistent with the
general rule that patent claims 'must be considered as a whole."' (quoting Diamond v.
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981))).
127 See Winans, 56 U.S. at 343. In modern terms, this concern with the substance of
the invention is the focus of the modern theory of infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents. See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S.
722, 732 (2002) ("The scope of a patent is not limited to its literal terms but instead
embraces all equivalents to the claims described." (citing Winans, 56 U.S. at 347)).
128 See, e.g., K-TEC, Inc. v. Vita-Mix Corp., 696 F.3d 1364, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
("To prove that a claim is invalid for anticipation, the accused infringer must show by
clear and convincing evidence that a single prior art reference discloses each and every
element of a claimed invention." (quotation marks and citation omitted)); Gen. Elec.
Co. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 685 F.3d 1034, 1042 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ("For infringement,
every element and limitation of a claim of the patent must be found in the accused
device, literally or in accordance with the doctrine of equivalents.").
129 See, e.g., AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac & Ugine, 344 F.3d 1234, 1240 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (identifying "the separate steps in an infringement analysis" as "claim




device has been made, used, sold, or offered for sale more than a year
prior to the filing of the patent application.1 30
If the form of the claim did not matter, the language in the claim
would not matter, and claim construction disputes would not be the
most important part of infringement litigation. But, in reality, "the
name of the game is the claim."131 If the form of a claim did not
matter, § 101 would not list statutory subject matter categories. But it
does.1 32 Moreover, if the form did not matter, the preamble of patent
claims would not recite the relevant statutory subject matter category,
or at least a similar term (e.g., "A device for doing this comprising the
following elements" or "A method for doing that comprising the
following steps"). The form of the claim matters, in other words,
because of the subject matter requirement of § 101. Likewise, the
definiteness requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112 concerns itself with the
form of patent claims; the claims must not be vague and ambiguous
but instead reasonably clear.133 In short, while the substance of the
claim (ultimately how the claimed invention differs from the prior art)
matters, so too does the form of the claim for purposes of determining
whether the claim meets the statutory conditions and requirements of
patentability. 134
The Supreme Court's third and last argument supporting its view
that practical application is not the relevant test for eligibility was that
focusing on whether the claim is directed to a practical application of a
natural law "would ill serve the principles underlying the prohibition
against patents for ideas or phenomena of nature."1 35 According to the
Court, "they are not the kind of 'discoveries' that the statute was
enacted to protect." 36 In a footnote, the Court explains that the
130 See, e.g., Minton v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 336 F.3d 1373, 1376 (Fed.
Cir. 2003) (describing the on-sale bar assessment where the "final step involves a
comparison of the asserted claims with the device or process that was sold").
131 Giles S. Rich, The Extent of the Protection and Interpretation of Claims-American
Perspectives, 21 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L., 497, 499 (1990) ("To coin a
phrase, the name of the game is the claim.").
132 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
133 See 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012); Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S.
Ct. 2120, 2129 (2014) (interpreting the language in § 112(b) "to require that a
patent's claims, viewed in light of the specification and prosecution history, inform
those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty").
134 Oskar Liivak, The Unresolved Interpretive Ambiguity of Patent Claims, 49
UC DAVIS L. REV. 1851, 1853 (2016) ("Claims are at the heart of almost every critical
question in patent law.").
135 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978).
136 Id.
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"underlying notion is that a scientific principle, such as that expressed
in [the] respondent's algorithm, reveals a relationship that has always
existed." 137 This reasoning is wholly unpersuasive. A claim to a
practical application of a scientific principle is by definition not a
claim to the scientific principle itself. Others are free to use the
scientific principle, just not using the same practical application
covered by the claim at issue. And the patent statute, and § 101 in
particular, was exactly drafted to protect practical applications of
ideas. 138
The Supreme Court's second alleged "fundamental misconception"
is the position that the Court's approach requiring inventiveness is
inconsistent with the view that a patent claim must be considered as a
whole.139 According to the Court, there was no eligible subject matter
before it because, "once [the claimed] algorithm is assumed to be
within the prior art, the [claim], considered as a whole, contains no
patentable invention."140 This reasoning fails for several reasons. Most
importantly, the patent statute says nothing about assuming any part
of a claim is within the prior art; to the contrary, the patent statute
goes to great lengths to describe what qualifies as prior art.141 But even
if the statute did condone making an assumption that part of a claim is
within the prior art, at that point it is not really true that the entire
claim is being considered as a whole; the part of the claim that is
assumed to be in the prior art is ignored. In short, ignoring part of the
claim is contrary to the Supreme Court's directive to consider the
claim as a whole.14 2 Anyway, the Court has confused novelty and non-
obviousness with eligibility; the inventiveness inquiry is contrary to
the Court's well-founded directive in Diehr not to consider the novelty
of claim elements when determining eligibility.143 Inventiveness and
eligibility should be unrelated inquiries; otherwise, they unnecessarily
duplicate one another.
137 Id. at 593 n.15.
138 See Taylor, supra note 15, at 226.
139 See Flook, 437 U.S. at 593-94.
140 Id. at 594.
141 See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
142 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981) ("In determining the eligibility of
respondents' claimed process for patent protection under § 101, their claims must be
considered as a whole. It is inappropriate to dissect the claims into old and new
elements and then to ignore the presence of the old elements in the analysis.").
143 See id. at 188-89 ("The 'novelty' of any element or steps in a process, or even of
the process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a
claim falls within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter.").
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While Flook's reasoning is unpersuasive, unfortunately it is not the
only Supreme Court case to reject the argument that "inventiveness" is
not a relevant concern of § 101 but instead should be relegated to
H§ 102 and 103. In Mayo, the Court stated that "[tihis approach ...
would make the 'law of nature' exception to § 101 patentability a dead
letter" and that "[t]he approach is therefore not consistent with prior
law."144 For support, the Court cited Flook and other decisions
applying the non-statutory exceptions, used reasoning that
contradicted Diehr and Flook, and made additional unpersuasive
arguments.
In terms of contradictions, in Mayo the Court contradicted Diehr by
stating that, "in evaluating the significance of additional steps, the
§ 101 patent-eligibility inquiry and, say, the § 102 novelty inquiry
might sometimes overlap."1 45 Diehr said the exact opposite, that " [t]he
'novelty' of any element or steps in a process, or even of the process
itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a
claim falls within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject
matter."1 46
Now consider the additional arguments. In rejecting the primacy of
the statutory analysis of novelty and non-obviousness under Hi 102
and 103 as compared to non-statutory analysis of inventiveness under
§ 101, the Court in Mayo misleadingly and incorrectly interprets the
legislative history behind the Patent Act of 1952. It does so by
highlighting certain language in the House Report accompanying the
Patent Act of 1952. In Mayo, the Court emphasized the language "not
necessarily patentable under section 101" when quoting the longer
statement from the report that "[a] person may have 'invented' a
machine or a manufacture, which may include anything under the sun
that is made by man, but it is not necessarily patentable under section
101 unless the conditions of the title are fulfilled."14 7 The Court
seemingly did so to try to emphasize that § 101 limits patentability
even if a machine or manufacture is made by a human. The extra
limitation, according to the Court, is the requirement of
144 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1303
(2012).
i45 Id. at 1304.
146 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188-89. Given the numerous contradictions in the Court's
precedent on eligible subject matter, one law professor has called for a housecleaning.
See generally John M. Golden, Flook Says One Thing, Diehr Says Another: A Need for
Housecleaning in the Law of Patentable Subject Matter, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1765
(2014).
147 Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1303-04 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)).
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inventiveness. 148 But the relevant part of this statement from the
report, and the one that truly deserves emphasis, is the last phrase,
"unless the conditions of the title are fulfilled." Given this phrase, as a
whole this statement from the legislative history provides a clear
reference to limits on patentability that exist in the remainder of the
patent statute, and in particular H§ 102 and 103. Those are the
"conditions" of patentability that must be fulfilled. Indeed, the patent
statute itself labels H§ 102 and 103 as the "conditions for
patentability. "149
Of more importance, however, because it addresses the relevant
policy considerations, is the Court's insistence in Mayo that "to shift
the patent-eligibility inquiry entirely to these later sections risks
creating significantly greater legal uncertainty, while assuming that
those sections can do work that they are not equipped to do."150 As a
preliminary matter, it is the Supreme Court's two-part test for
eligibility, and in particular the searches for abstract ideas and
"inventive concepts," that has created the uncertainty. 15 ' There would
be more certainty if the Court eliminated its test in favor of the
established and well-developed statutory and historical approaches to
eligibility, novelty, and non-obviousness. But the Court's main point is
that "§§ 102 and 103 say nothing about treating laws of nature as if
they were part of the prior art when applying those sections," 152 and
the Court clearly believes as a policy matter that laws of nature must
not be patentable.
Setting aside how ironic it is for the Court to criticize anyone else
for not pointing to specific statutory language to justify its approach in
this area - after all the Court is applying what it itself calls an
"implicit exception" 153 - in reality there is no need for § 102 to say
that laws of nature qualify as prior art. The main reason is that the
statutory subject matter requirement of § 101 excludes claims to
148 The Court highlighted this language in the course of defending its conclusion
that "the process claims at issue here do not satisfy [the requirement of an inventive
concept]" because "the steps in the claimed processes (apart from the natural laws
themselves) involve well-understood, routine, conventional activity previously
engaged in by researchers in the field," id. at 1294, and in particular while rejecting
the Government's argument that "virtually any step beyond a statement of a law of
nature itself should transform an unpatentable law of nature into a potentially
patentable application sufficient to satisfy § 101's demands," id. at 1303.
149 See 35 U.S.C. H§ 102, 103 (2012).
150 Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1304.
151 See Taylor, supra note 15, at 225-26.
152 Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1304.
153 Id. at 1293.
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natural laws. The statutory subject matter requirement mandates that
only processes, machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter
are eligible for patenting;1 54 as I have discussed elsewhere, to qualify as
eligible subject matter, what is claimed must be the result of human
effort.1 55 There is no need to search for an "inventive concept" to
exclude natural laws from being patented. All that one needs to do is
ensure that a claim describes one of the listed categories of subject
matter, be it a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter. If a claim does so, that claim will describe something
manmade and therefore eligible for patenting, but the claim will be
patentable only if the claim meets the conditions and requirements of
H§ 102, 103, and 112.
Furthermore, as a matter of statutory interpretation and policy,
§ 102 should not be interpreted to mean that laws of nature qualify as
prior art. Laws of nature are not prior art because they are not "art."1 56
But even if laws of nature were prior art, the law should not require
the first person to discover a law of nature to invent non-obvious
applications of that law of nature. To encourage the discovery and
application of natural laws, the first person to discover a natural law
should be able to obtain a patent on practical applications of the
natural law that are claimed and supported in the specification of a
patent. In other words, those claims must meet the utility, written
description, and enablement requirements.1 57
Notably, as a matter of policy, even Judge Dyk - a supporter of the
misguided decisions of Mayo and Alice1 58 - would not require the first
discoverer of a natural law to create inventive (non-obvious)
applications of that natural law, or interpret § 102 to mean that natural
laws qualify as prior art. He would allow the first discoverer to obtain a
patent on practical applications of the natural law, but only those
practical applications that are actually reduced to practice.1 59 In other
154 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
155 See Taylor, supra note 15, at 212-14.
156 See id. at 194, 213-15.
157 See 35 U.S.C. H§ 101 (utility), 112(a) (2012) (written description and
enablement).
158 See Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 809 F.3d 1282, 1287 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (Dyk, J., concurring in the denial of en banc rehearing) ("In my view the
framework of Mayo and Alice is an essential ingredient of a healthy patent system,
allowing the invalidation of improperly issued and highly anticompetitive patents
without the need for protracted and expensive litigation.").
159 See id. at 1291 ("[1]f the breadth of the claim is sufficiently limited to a specific
application of the new law of nature discovered by the patent applicant and reduced to
practice, I think that the novelty of the discovery should be enough to supply the
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words, he would allow the patenting of those practical applications that
the inventor actually builds and, if necessary, tests to confirm their
workability.1 60 He would not allow the patenting of practical
applications that the inventor discloses and explains to one of ordinary
skill in the art how to build and use, if the inventor did not actually
build or use the practical applications.161 Notably, Judge Dyk's approach
is not consistent with the traditional approach to eligibility under the
current patent statute, which merely requires disclosure of practical
applications of natural laws, where the practical application takes the
form of a man-made process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter.1 62 Nor is it consistent with the current statutory written
description and enablement requirements, which focus on the
disclosure in the specification rather than what the inventor built and
tested. 163 Judge Dyk's approach is, thus, relatively radical; it would
require not just a rewriting of the patent statute but one based on a new
conception of the appropriate balancing of the competing policies
underlying many different aspects of the patent statute. It certainly is
not the one Congress wrote into the patent statute.
B. The Ability to Improve Existing Requirements
All of this is not to say that the existing statutory doctrines perfectly
constrain the breadth of claims, eliminate abstract claim language,
ensure that claims issue only to non-obvious inventions, and permit
wide use of natural laws and natural phenomena.1 64 Their success in
necessary inventive concept. My proposed approach would require that the claimed
application be both narrow in scope and actually reduced to practice, not merely
'constructively' reduced to practice by filing of a patent application replete with
prophetic examples.").
160 See id. It is somewhat remarkable - and telling - that while Judge Dyk
supports the Supreme Court's attempts to restrict patentability in Mayo and Alice,
even he faults the Supreme Court's test for striking the wrong balance. See id. at 1287
("I share the concerns of some of my colleagues that a too restrictive test for patent
eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 with respect to laws of nature (reflected in some of
the language in Mayo) may discourage development and disclosure of new diagnostic
and therapeutic methods in the life sciences, which are often driven by discovery of
new natural laws and phenomena.").
161 See id. at 1291.
162 See Le Roy v. Tatham, 63 U.S. 132, 135-36 (1859) (citing Househill Co. v.
Neilson, Webster's Patent Cases, 683); Taylor, supra note 15, at 214-17, 216 n.314.
163 See Alcon Research Ltd. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 745 F.3d 1180, 1188 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (discussing enablement); Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336,
1340 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (discussing written description).
164 For a discussion of how the current patent statute already reflects these
underlying policy goals, see Taylor, supra note 15, at 191-97.
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this regard, of course, depends on their interpretation and application.
But if claims merely describe natural laws or abstract claim language
or do not describe something sufficiently inventive, these statutory
doctrines are the ones to study and revise. Indeed, any continuing
concerns with claim breadth, abstractness, and lack of inventiveness
highlight that these longstanding statutory doctrines may need to be
revised to take into account critics' concerns. But, in this regard, it is
important to recognize that many of these statutory doctrines have
been challenged and revised in favor of narrowing claims, more clearly
defining claims, and increasing the level of inventiveness required -
and only recently.
The Supreme Court has, for example, relatively recently addressed
the non-obviousness requirement of § 103, tightening it to ensure that
it is more difficult to obtain broad patent rights. In KSR International
Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,'165 the Court rejected three aspects of the Federal
Circuit's non-obviousness jurisprudence.1 66 First, the Court expanded
the obviousness inquiry by permitting courts and patent examiners to
look beyond just the narrow problem the patentee was trying to
solve.167 Second, it similarly sanctioned an inquiry that looks beyond
just the elements of the prior art designed to solve the same problem
the inventor confronted.1 68 Third, it extended the doctrine of
obviousness to cover circumstances where a combination of elements
was "obvious to try."' 69 In each respect, the Court made it easier for
patent examiners and courts to find claims to be non-obvious. The
Court ultimately adopted an "expansive and flexible approach" to
obviousness 70 - a "functional approach" that involves "a broad
inquiry."171 Thus, to the extent the non-obviousness requirement
somehow did not require sufficient inventiveness, KSR presented an
opportunity to fix this defect.
165 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
166 See id. at 419-22.
167 See id. at 420 ("The first error of the Court of Appeals in this case was to
foreclose this reasoning by holding that courts and patent examiners should look only
to the problem the patentee was trying to solve.").
168 See id. ("The second error of the Court of Appeals lay in its assumption that a
person of ordinary skill attempting to solve a problem will be led only to those
elements of prior art designed to solve the same problem.").
169 See id. at 421 ("The same constricted analysis led the Court of Appeals to
conclude, in error, that a patent claim cannot be proved obvious merely by showing
that the combination of elements was '[o]bvious to try."').
170 Id. at 415.
171 Id.
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The Supreme Court, furthermore, recently revised the test for
complying with the definiteness requirement of § 112, increasing its
vigor as well. In Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., the Court
rejected the Federal Circuit's test for definiteness, which merely
required that claims be "amenable to construction" and not "insolubly
ambiguous." 172 In its place, the Court held that claims must be
"reasonably certain."173 It should thus be more difficult now for
arguably ambiguous claim language to meet the definiteness
requirement, and the result should be a reduction in abstract claiming.
Moreover, the Supreme Court's decision on the issue of definiteness
comes on the heels of numerous cases decided by the Federal Circuit
in the last eight years invalidating claims to software algorithms based
on lack of definiteness. In these cases, the Federal Circuit has cited the
lack of disclosure of algorithms in the specifications of the relevant
patents as corresponding structures for those patents' means-plus-
function limitations, resulting in findings of indefiniteness.174 The
requirement that the specifications of patents disclose algorithms
supporting means-plus-function limitations drawn to functional
computer language will also fight problems with abstract claiming, but
also provide an incentive to craft claims more narrowly than they
would otherwise be crafted.
Likewise, the Federal Circuit recently revised the test for determining
whether claim language should be limited to the embodiments disclosed
in the specification of a patent pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 112(f), which
governs functional claiming. Pursuant to the court's precedent, claims
were subject to a "strong" presumption, "not readily overcome," that
they were not limited to the embodiments disclosed in the
172 Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2124 (2014).
'73 Id. at 2129 (interpreting "§ 112, 9 2 to require that a patent's claims, viewed in
light of the specification and prosecution history, inform those skilled in the art about
the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty").
17 See, e.g., Function Media, LLC v. Google, Inc., 708 F.3d 1310, 1319 (Fed. Cir.
2013); ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., 700 F.3d 509, 518 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Noah
Sys., Inc. v. Intuit, Inc., 675 F.3d 1302, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Ergo Licensing, LLC v.
CareFusion 303, Inc., 673 F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Stamps.com, Inc. v.
Endicia, Inc., 437 F. App'x 897, 912 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Blackboard, Inc. v.
Desire2Learn, Inc., 574 F.3d 1371, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Encyclopaedia Britannica,
Inc. v. Alpine Elecs., Inc., 355 F. App'x 389, 395 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Aristocrat Techs.
Australia Pty Ltd. v. Int'l Game Tech., 521 F.3d 1328, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also
Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (adopting narrow
construction during analysis of indefiniteness defense). But see Chi. Bd. Options
Exch., Inc. v. Int'l Secs. Exch., LLC, 748 F.3d 1134, 1140 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (finding
compliance with definiteness requirement); Typhoon Touch Techs., Inc. v. Dell, Inc.,
659 F.3d 1376, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (same).
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specification.17 5 To overcome this strong presumption required "a
showing that the limitation essentially is devoid of anything that can be
construed as structure" for performing a claimed function,1 76 a
significant hurdle. According to the Federal Circuit, the problem with
this precedent was that it "resulted in a proliferation of functional
claiming . . . free of the strictures set forth in the statute" - namely the
requirement that functional claim language be limited to the
embodiments disclosed in the specification.1 77 So, the Federal Circuit
announced, it was reversing its law. The court will no longer require
any heightened evidence to prove that claim language is limited to the
embodiments in the specification.17 8 It expressly overruled the idea that
the presumption that claim language was not limited to the specification
was "strong," and it overruled its strict requirement that the claim
language "must be essentially devoid of anything that can be construed
as structure" before it would be limited to the embodiments disclosed in
the specification.1 79 As a result, claims should be construed more often
to be limited to the specific embodiments disclosed in the
corresponding specification of the patent. This too limits abstract
claiming, and results in narrower claims.
In the not too distant past, the Supreme Court also expanded the
statutory experimental use exception. In Merck KGAA v. Integra
Lifesciences I, Ltd.,180 the Court rejected the Federal Circuit's narrow
interpretation of the governing statute, which limited its protection to
uses of patented inventions that result in submission of information to
the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA").181 The Court instead
determined that the statute extends to uses where there was a
reasonable basis to believe that the uses would produce types of
information relevant to the FDA.1 82 By doing so, the Court expanded
the statutory defense to experimental use of patented technology, and
in the process - consistent with the theme of eligibility cases focused
on concerns with preemption of use of natural laws and phenomena
175 Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(quoting Lighting World, Inc. v. Birchwood Lighting, Inc., 382 F.3d 1354, 1358 (Fed.
Cir. 2004)).




180 545 U.S. 193 (2005).
181 See id. at 205-07.
182 See id. at 207.
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- limited the ability to exclude the use of basic tools of research and
science. 183
In all these ways, courts have shown a remarkable proclivity to
reconsider the interpretation and application of various statutory
doctrines that address the underlying concerns the Supreme Court has
expressed in its eligibility cases. Besides these statutory doctrines,
however, perhaps courts should focus attention on improving the
common law doctrines, such as the common law experimental use
exception. Indeed, there is reason to think that the common law
experimental use exception is too narrow.184 Yet the Supreme Court as
a whole has never addressed the common law experimental use
exception. Indeed, the only instances where any member of the
Supreme Court has addressed it are the two opinions arguably creating
the exception, both of which were written by Justice Story as he rode
the circuit. 185 This has allowed the Federal Circuit, most recently, to
develop the law. It, in turn, has interpreted the experimental use
183 See id. This was not the only time the Court interpreted the patent statute
broadly to favor experimental use of patented technology. In Eli Lilly & Co. v.
Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990), the Court considered whether activities that
normally constituted patent infringement were non-infringing under 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(e)(1) if they were performed for the purpose of submitting information for
consideration by the FDA to obtain marketing approval for a medical device. Id. at
663-64. The Court held that the statute broadly covers activities related both to drugs
and to medical devices. See id. at 674. In that case, however, the Court was not
patching a hole created by a lower court; it affirmed the Federal Circuit's similar
conclusion. See id. at 678.
184 See, e.g., Shamnad Basheer & Prashant Reddy, The "Experimental Use" Exception
Through a Developmental Lens, 50 IDEA 831, 833 (2010) (arguing that allowing the
experimental use exception to cover "the testing of patented inventions with a view to
creating improvements or inventing around such patents" is "particularly appealing in
the context of developing countries"); Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public
Get? Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 81, 83, 91 (arguing
that there are "reasons to believe that a well-designed experimental-use exemption
from infringement liability can promote faster cumulative technological progress
without significantly diminishing incentives to invest in the original invention" and
noting that "[platent exclusivity, while promoting inventive progress by providing
incentives for innovation, can slow technical progress if the best follow-on inventors
are prevented from building upon the inventive idea during the patent term.").
185 "The so-called experimental use defense to liability for infringement generally is
recognized as originating in an opinion written by Supreme Court Justice Story while
on circuit in Massachusetts." Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858,
862 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (citing Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121, (C.C.D.
Mass. 1813)). Justice Story also addressed the exception the same year in another case,
Sawin v. Guild, 21 F. Cas. 554 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813). For a summary of all the cases
prior to 1957 addressing the experimental use exception, see Richard E. Bee,
Experimental Use as an Act of Infringement, 39 PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 357 (1957).
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exception narrowly, limiting the exception to situations where actions
were performed "for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly
philosophical inquiry."1 86 It has held that use does not qualify as
experimental when it "has definite, cognizable, and not insubstantial
commercial purposes."1 87 And it has said that use is not experimental
where the use is "in keeping with the legitimate business of the alleged
infringer," such as use in research projects at universities that result in
"educating and enlightening students and faculty participating in these
projects," "increas[ing] the status of the institution," and "lur[ing]
lucrative research grants, students and faculty."1 88
Returning to statutory doctrines, perhaps the courts also should
focus attention on improving the statutory written description and
enablement requirements. Indeed, some commentators think that the
enablement requirement in particular is too lax.189 Yet, while the
Supreme Court has granted four petitions to hear cases involving
§ 101 in the last six years, it has not addressed either the written
description or the enablement requirement since 1938, when it
confronted a related argument in Schribner-Schroth Co. v. Cleveland
Trust.'90 And even then, the discussion in that case focused on the
policy of encouraging public disclosure, rather than on the concern of
providing sufficient descriptions of how to make and use the patented
technology to support the scope of broad claims.191 Indeed, it is quite
remarkable that the Supreme Court has not taken any case related to
either the enablement or written description requirement given the
numerous hotly disputed cases on point at the Federal Circuit in the
last fifteen years.1 92
186 Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cit. 2002) (quoting Embrex,
Inc. v. Service Eng'g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
187 Id. (quoting Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co, 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir.
1984)).
188 Id.
189 See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Wisdom of the Ages or Dead-Hand Control?
Patentable Subject Matter for Diagnostic Methods After In re Bilski, 3 CASE W. RES. J.L.
TECH. & INTERNET 1, 59 (2012); id. at 59 n.290 (citing criticisms of the enablement
doctrine by Tun-Jen Chiang, Kevin Collins, and Jeffrey Lefstin); Mark A. Lemley et al.,
Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1330-31 (2011).
190 305 U.S. 47, 56 (1938) (finding a violation of the prohibition on introduction of
new matter).
191 Id. at 57 ("The object of the statute is to require the patentee to describe his
invention so that others may construct and use it after the expiration of the patent and
'to inform the public during the life of the patent of the limits of the monopoly
asserted, so that it may be known which features may be safely used or manufactured
without a license and which may not."').
192 See generally, e.g., Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed.
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The utility requirement, not recently revisited by courts, 1 9 3 is
another statutory doctrine that is particularly important for purposes
of reconsideration of the Supreme Court's eligibility cases; it also
already advances the same policies the Supreme Court has favored in
its most recent cases addressing eligibility. In Brenner v. Manson,194 the
Supreme Court interpreted the utility requirement to require specific
and substantial utility; 195 it was insufficient that a chemical process
produced the intended product and that the product belonged to a
class of compounds the subject of serious scientific investigation.1 96
The Court was concerned with granting "a monopoly of
knowledge ... only if clearly commanded by the statute."1 97 The
Court explained:
Until the process claim has been reduced to production of a
product shown to be useful, the metes and bounds of that
monopoly are not capable of precise delineation. It may
engross a vast, unknown, and perhaps unknowable area. Such
a patent may confer power to block off whole areas of
scientific development, without compensating benefit to the
public. The basic quid pro quo contemplated by the
Constitution and the Congress for granting a patent monopoly
is the benefit derived by the public from an invention with
substantial utility. Unless and until a process is refined and
developed to this point - where specific benefit exists in
currently available form - there is insufficient justification for
Cir. 2010) (en banc) (addressing whether a separate written description requirement
exists in § 112 and the relevant policies the requirement supports); LizardTech, Inc. v.
Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 433 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (denying rehearing en banc
on the question whether a separate written description requirement exists in § 112);
Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 375 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (same); Enzo
Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 970 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (same).
193 The other statutory doctrines not recently revisited by courts are the novelty
requirement and statutory bars. The Supreme Court last considered either of these
doctrines in Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, where the Court decided that the on-sale bar may
apply even if the invention is not yet reduced to practice but is ready for patenting and
on sale. See generally Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., 525 U.S. 55 (1998). The Court explained
that one of the policies supporting this statutory bar is that it "serves as a limiting
provision, both excluding ideas that are in the public domain from patent protection
and confining the duration of the monopoly to the statutory term." Id. at 64.
194 383 U.S. 519 (1966).
195 See id. at 534.
196 See id. at 532-33.
197 Id. at 534.
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permitting an applicant to engross what may prove to be a
broad field. 198
Thus, the Court used the utility requirement to ensure that claims are
clear, narrow, and do not inappropriately prevent use of the basic
tools of science and technological development - the very concerns
of the Supreme Court in its recent cases addressing patent
eligibility.1 99 In one respect, however, the utility requirement might be
improved. Rather than merely require the inventor to describe a
practical application in the specification, which is already a feature of
the enablement requirement, the utility requirement in § 101 might
require the inventor to describe the practical application in the claim.
Indeed, this distinction might point to an independent need for the
utility requirement in § 101 as opposed to § 112.
In short, the Supreme Court's concerns with claim breadth, abstract
claiming, and preclusion of the building blocks of science and
technology ought first to be addressed by continued common law
interpretation and application of the statutory patentability and
specification requirements. And to the extent the interpretation and
application of those requirements fail to address the Supreme Court's
concerns adequately, Congress should first consider amending the
statutes governing those requirements.
III. GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR AMENDING PATENT ELIGIBILITY
Regardless of whether Congress amends any of the statutory
patentability requirements, the confusion, lack of administrability, and
risk of underinvestment in research and development created by the
Supreme Court's two-part test for eligibility articulated in Mayo - and
the Court's inability or unwillingness to correct these problems -
provides a basis for Congress to consider legislation to correct the law
of patent eligibility. In this Part, I submit four basic guiding principles
that should guide any legislation to correct this law: broad eligibility,
clarity, constraint on judicial intervention, and flexibility.
A. Broad Eligibility
The Constitution identifies the goal of the patent system: promotion
of the progress of the useful arts.200 The Constitution likewise specifies
198 Id. at 534-35.
199 See Taylor, supra note 15, at 189-91.
200 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (authorizing Congress to pass laws "To promote the
Progress of .. . useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the
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the way to achieve that result, by securing for limited times to
inventors the exclusive right to their discoveries. 201 The basic
proposition is that granting inventors a temporary right to exclude
others from using their discoveries will encourage inventors and their
supporters to invest in research and development that, often enough at
least, produces discoveries that will better the state of mankind. The
patent system, in the words of Abraham Lincoln, "added the fuel of
interest to the fire of genius."202 That "interest" is an economic one;
the patent system is based on a utilitarian theory, not a natural rights
theory.2 03 And, while the question of whether patent law is necessary
or efficient in general to achieve its goal is unproven and perhaps
unprovable,2 04 it is the theory that Congress has adopted and put into
practice through the patent statute.205
exclusive Right to their . .. Discoveries").
201 See id.
202 ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Lecture on Discoveries and Inventions, in ABRAHAM LINCOLN:
SPEECHES AND WRITINGS, 1859-1865, at 10-11 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1989); see
also MICHAEL NOVAK, THE FIRE OF INVENTION, THE FUEL OF INTEREST: ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 1 (1996).
203 See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ("The economic philosophy
behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the
conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to
advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and
useful Arts.' Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve rewards
commensurate with the services rendered."); Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic
Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23J. LEGAL STUD. 247, 247 (1994) ("In short, the patent
system prevents others from reaping where they have not sown and thereby promotes
research and development (R & D) investment in innovation. The patent law achieves
this laudable end by creating property rights in inventions.").
204 See, e.g., SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, & COPYRIGHTS OF THE COMM. ON
THEJUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM (Comm. Print
1958) ("If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of
our present knowledge of its economic consequences, to recommend instituting one.
But since we have had a patent system for a long time, it would be irresponsible, on
the basis of our present knowledge, to recommend abolishing it.").
205 The question of whether patent law is not necessary or inefficient in general to
achieve its goal is similarly unproven and perhaps unprovable. See id. Likewise, some
may argue that the Supreme Court's current approach actually substantially increases
incentives to invest in research and development because there is less fear of claims of
patent infringement. This argument, however, to a large extent contradicts the very
basis for the patent system. There is no data proving this position, and the burden of
proving the patent system is unnecessary falls on opponents of the patent system, who
have been unable to substantiate this claim. See Taylor, supra note 15, at 163 n.21. In
a very real sense, these opponents of the patent system favor faith in the lack of a need
for the patent system over the historical evidence pointing to its success.
2190 [Vol. 50:2149
Amending Patent Eligibility
For the theory of the patent system to be successful, inventors and
their supporters must anticipate legal protection at the outset, at the
time they decide to invest in research and development. Also, with
declining significance, they must anticipate legal protection all the way
along the path toward discovery, lest they abandon their pursuits.
Broad eligibility is, thus, consistent with the theory. Inventors and
their supporters must expect the fruits of their labors to be eligible for
patenting. Exceptions, then, should be targeted statutorily only when
there is some justification for excluding fields of technology. For
example, patent protection may not be necessary when the
government already sufficiently invests in the relevant research and
development or when there are other sufficient incentives, such as
respect in the relevant field or monetary prizes, that stimulate
investment in research and development.206
None of this denies that there are significant concerns with
overpatenting. But the basis to deal with the problem of overpatenting
should be the statutory doctrines Congress actually put in place to
limit the ability to obtain patents. Those statutory doctrines are the
utility and subject matter requirements of § 101, the novelty
requirement and statutory bars of § 102, the non-obviousness
requirement of § 103, and the written description, enablement,
definiteness, and functional claiming requirements of § 112.207
Collectively, those are what I refer to here as the patentability and
specification requirements. As the statute is currently constructed,
however, the exceptions from eligibility include only the utility and
subject matter requirements of § 101. And those requirements,
respectively, ask whether an invention is a practical application of a
natural law, phenomenon, or idea, and whether the invention is the
result of human effort. 208 If an inventor has created something that
does not exist in nature, and applied that thing to a practical end, that
is all eligibility requires. Eligible subject matter must, of course, meet
all of the patentability and specification requirements before a patent
will issue.
206 See generally Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patentable Subject Matter and Nonpatent
Innovation Incentives, 5 UC IRVINE L. REv. 1115 (2015).
207 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 (2012) (subject matter), 102 (novelty and statutory bars),
103 (non-obviousness), 112(a) (written description and enablement), 112(b)
(definiteness), 112(f) (functional claiming).
208 See Taylor, supra note 15, at 207, 211-12, 217.
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B. Clarity
Beyond broad eligibility, a guiding principle for any statutory reform
should include clarity. Blurry lines do not induce inventors and their
supporters to invest in research and development; blurry lines create
risk, which suppresses investment. Nor, by the way, does change - or
even the prospect of change - of the governing rules of conduct
support investment in research and development. 209
This interest in clarity certainly should be applied to the law
governing eligibility and, more broadly, the law governing the
patentability and specification requirements. But the interest in clarity
also should be applied to the claims of patents. In a very real way, the
claims of patents represent the law in the sense that they define the
legal right to exclude. Thus, the claims of patents may themselves be
analogized to statutes. 210 Because their interpretation and application
to future conduct shapes the decisions that future actors make
concerning how they will invest their time and money, and in
particular whether they will invest time and money in developing
technology, both patent law and patent claims should be clear.
With respect to both the law and claims, however, consider how the
interest in clarity engages with a competing interest. While it is
important, for example, that claims clearly define the scope of the
patent right - to identify safe harbors for those seeking to avoid
infringement and also to eliminate disputes over infringement - it is
also important to protect inventors from unscrupulous copyists who
may change some minor aspect of the invention to avoid compensating
the patent owner. Patent law itself seeks to balance this interest in
clarity with the competing interest in rewarding inventors. It does so,
however, through the doctrine of equivalents, a common law doctrine
that permits patent owners to prove infringement even in the presence
of minor variations from the literal terms of patent claims. 211 Thus,
209 See John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as "Prime Percolator": A Prescription for
Appellate Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REV. 657, 687 (2009)
(describing the impact of uncertainty caused by lack of clarity and change itself on
"private planning and commerce").
210 See Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 847 (2015)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Because they are governmental dispositions and provide
rules that bind the public at large, patent claims resemble statutes.").
211 See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731-
32 (2002) ("If patents were always interpreted by their literal terms, their value would
be greatly diminished. Unimportant and insubstantial substitutes for certain elements
could defeat the patent, and its value to inventors could be destroyed by simple acts of
copying. For this reason, the clearest rule of patent interpretation, literalism, may
conserve judicial resources but is not necessarily the most efficient rule. The scope of
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patent law has developed a particular doctrine to address the
countervailing interest in protecting inventors, and it remains true that
the law governing the patentability and specification requirements -
including the eligibility requirement - should be clear.
C. Constraint on Judicial Intervention
The next principle that should guide any attempt to correct the law
governing patent eligibility is the need to put constraints on judicial
intervention in this area. The Supreme Court has not been shy about
interpreting § 101 without regard for its explicit text, but instead
based on the Court's own view of the governing policies, to create
exceptions to patent eligibility. The Court itself calls the group of
exceptions an "implicit exception." 212 In truth, the exceptions are
common law exceptions resulting from policymaking divorced from
the text of the statute. The Court does not attempt to tie the
exceptions to the statutory text. Even the conservative Supreme Court
Justices - who elsewhere tout the supreme importance of textual
interpretation 213 - in the context of patent eligibility resort to, or at
least comply with, bald policymaking at worst, and loose
interpretations of the statutory text at best. 214
The Supreme Court's approach to eligibility and its decision to
require a search for an inventive concept is policymaking; this became
clear recently when one of the few judicial proponents (outside of the
Supreme Court) of Mayo and Alice highlighted problems with the
Supreme Court's approach and offered a solution based on his own
view of the best policy. As discussed above, Judge Dyk has expressed
his opposition to the idea - indeed the Supreme Court's original
view 215 - that practical applications of natural laws and physical
a patent is not limited to its literal terms but instead embraces all equivalents to the
claims described." (citing Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330, 347 (1854))).
212 See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293
(2012) ("The Court has long held that [35 U.S.C. § 101] contains an important
implicit exception. '[L]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas' are not
patentable." (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981))).
213 See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAw (2012).
214 Both Mayo and Alice were unanimously decided, and Justice Thomas wrote the
opinion in Alice. See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2351 (2014); Mayo
Collaborative, 132 S. Ct. at 1293.
215 See Le Roy v. Tatham, 63 U.S. 132, 135-36 (1859) ("A patent will be good,
though the subject of the patent consists in the discovery of a great, general, and most
comprehensive principle in science or law of nature, if that principle is, by the
specification, applied to any special purpose, so as thereby to effectuate a practical
result and benefit not previously attained." (quotation marks omitted) (quoting
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phenomena should be eligible for consideration of their patentability
pursuant to the statutory patentability and specification requirements
expressed in H§ 102, 103, and 112.216 He likewise highlighted his
opposition to the idea - the Supreme Court's new view - that only
inventive applications of natural laws and physical phenomena should
be eligible for consideration of their patentability.217 In an attempt to
split the baby, Judge Dyk proposed that inventors be entitled to
pursue claims to practical applications of natural laws and physical
phenomena, but only when those practical applications have been
actually reduced to practice, in other words built and tested as
necessary to confirm that they work.218 He would not allow inventors
to pursue claims to practical applications of natural laws and physical
phenomena even when those inventors have disclosed how to make
and use those applications in a patent application.2 19 What statutory
basis does Judge Dyk have for this creative solution? None. It is his
own view of how to reconcile the divergent policies underlying patent
eligibility. It would require rewriting the patent statute.
Similarly, the Supreme Court has not been shy about using § 101 as
its "plaything" - its statutory basis to invoke considerations of policy
to prohibit patents from issuing to disfavored inventions. As I have
discussed, the Court repeatedly grants petitions to hear cases on
eligibility rather than the other statutory patentability and
Househill Co. v. Neilson, Webster's Patent Cases, 683)); see also id. at 137 ("However
brilliant the discovery of the new principle may be, to make it useful it must be
applied to some practical purpose. Short of this, no patent can be granted.").
216 See Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 809 F.3d 1282, 1291 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (Dyk, J., concurring in the denial of en banc rehearing) ("Even when a patent
applicant has demonstrated some particular utility for a newly discovered law of
nature and reduced it to practice, the claim should be invalid unless narrowly tailored
to the particular application of the law that has been developed.").
217 See id. at 1289 ("[A]s I see it, there is a problem with Mayo insofar as it
concludes that inventive concept cannot come from discovering something new in
nature - e.g., identification of a previously unknown natural relationship or property.
In my view, Mayo did not fully take into account the fact that an inventive concept
can come not just from creative, unconventional application of a natural law, but also
from the creativity and novelty of the discovery of the law itself.").
218 See id. at 1291 ("[I]f the breadth of the claim is sufficiently limited to a specific
application of the new law of nature discovered by the patent applicant and reduced to
practice, I think that the novelty of the discovery should be enough to supply the
necessary inventive concept. My proposed approach would require that the claimed
application be both narrow in scope and actually reduced to practice, not merely





specification requirements found in §H 102, 103, and 112.220 The
Court, it seems, cannot keep its hands off of eligibility; the doctrine of
eligibility is too useful to eliminate patents and reject patent
applications the Court disfavors on policy grounds. Prior to 1952, the
Supreme Court used the "invention" requirement to do so;221 now it
uses the "inventive concept" requirement to do so. Despite the
elimination of the "invention" requirement in the Patent Act of
1952,222 the Court has resurrected the same requirement in the form
of a requirement of an "inventive concept."
The fact that the Supreme Court has done so is ironic given its own
repeated recognition that it is not the right government institution to
weigh these policies and to place these restrictions on eligibility.223
Congress, the Court admits, is the entity of the federal government
that has the power to consider the relevant policies and put in place a
workable scheme for deciding which patent applications merit patent
protection. It is hard to disagree with the Court's own recognition that
Congress has better institutional competency in this regard. 224
220 See supra Part L.A.
221 Giles S. Rich, Principles of Patentability, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 393, 404 (1960),
reprinted in 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 135,144 (2004) ("The requirement for 'invention' was the
plaything of the judges who, as they became initiated into its mysteries, delighted to
devise and expound their own ideas of what it meant, some very lovely prose
resulting.") [hereinafter Principles].
222 See id. at 145 ("The Patent Act of 1952 expresses this prerequisite to patentability
without any reference to 'invention' as a legal requirement. Nowhere in the entire act is
there any reference to a requirement of 'invention' and the drafters did this
deliberately in an effort to free the law and lawyers from bondage to that old and
meaningless term. The word 'invention' is used in the statute only to refer to the thing
invented. That is why the requirement of 'invention' should be referred to, if at all,
only with respect due to that which is dead.").
223 See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
224 Given their lack of a textual basis and how clearly they represent policymaking,
it is difficult to explain why the conservative justices have joined in the Mayo and
Alice opinions. Perhaps they have done so because of the perception that the common
law has long embraced the exceptions for natural laws, physical phenomena, and
abstract ideas. In this sense, Justices Alito, Roberts, Scalia, and Thomas may be
understood to have agreed with these opinions out of respect for stare decisis. The
problem with this understanding, however, is that the search for an "inventive
concept" did not become the focus of eligibility law until 2012. See Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012) (" [A]
process that focuses upon the use of a natural law [must] also contain other elements
or a combination of elements, sometimes referred to as an 'inventive concept,'
sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a
patent upon the natural law itself."). Even if there are some older cases supporting this
test, see Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978) ("Even though a phenomenon of
nature or mathematical formula may be well known, an inventive application of the
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The Court's propensity to use § 101 to prohibit patentability for all
kinds of policy reasons, despite its admitted inferior institutional
competency to do so, should be recognized and steps taken to prevent
the Court's intervention. In other words, Congress should make it
clear that the time for judicially created, common law development of
non-statutory exceptions to eligibility has past; in place of the
Supreme Court's common law should stand the statutory patentability
and specification requirements put in place by Congress and the
President.2 2 5
In particular, rather than a test dependent on the subjective views of
judges or patent examiners, Congress should consider including
principle may be patented. Conversely, the discovery of such a phenomenon cannot
support a patent unless there is some other inventive concept in its application.");
Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 132 (1948) ("The
application of this newly-discovered natural principle to the problem of packaging of
inoculants may well have been an important commercial advance. But once nature's
secret of the non-inhibitive quality of certain strains of the species of Rhizobium was
discovered, the state of the art made the production of a mixed inoculant a simple
step. Even though it may have been the product of skill, it certainly was not the
product of invention."), the Court later clearly rejected it, see Diamond v. Diehr, 450
U.S. 175, 187-88 (1981) ("It is now commonplace that an application of a law of
nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be
deserving of patent protection... . Arrhenius' equation is not patentable in isolation,
but when a process for curing rubber is devised which incorporates in it a more
efficient solution of the equation, that process is at the very least not barred at the
threshold by § 101."); id. at 188-89 ("The 'novelty' of any element or steps in a
process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the
subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable
subject matter."); id. at 192 ("[Wlhen a claim containing a mathematical formula
implements or applies that formula in a structure or process which, when considered
as a whole, is performing a function which the patent laws were designed to protect
(e. g., transforming or reducing an article to a different state or thing), then the claim
satisfies the requirements of § 101."). Indeed, some of the hallmark reasons to respect
precedent with respect to the search for an "inventive concept" do not exist.
Nevertheless, it seems likely, particularly after Alice and given other considerations,
that the Court would apply stare decisis. See Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294.
225 One way to ensure that courts do not use eligibility law when it should be using
other sections of the patent statute, is to clarify in the patent statute that § 101 is not a
defense in litigation. See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335, 1341 (Fed.
Cir. 2013), vacated sub nom. WildTangent, Inc. v. Ultramercial, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 2870
(2014) (noting that "the patentee did not argue that § 101 is not a defense to
infringement"). Indeed, that may have been the original intent by the drafters of the
patent statute. Section 282 conspicuously omits identification of § 101 as a defense in
litigation. See 35 U.SC. § 282(b) (2012). If § 101 is not a defense in litigation,
however, the requirements of § 101 would still be enforceable by the USPTO and
ultimately by courts in appeals from rejections by the USPTO. See generally, e.g., Bilski




objective guidelines constraining the analysis. Like the codification of
the non-obviousness requirement in § 103, it might be helpful to
identify in any statutory amendment the relevant perspective of one of
ordinary skill in the art. Congress might also specify the relevant time
period for the analysis - not a post hoc, backward looking
reevaluation of the relevant inquiry subject to hindsight bias, but
instead one focused on the perspective of one at the time of the filing
of the patent application in question. In other words, constrain the
ability to summarily make decisions based on subjective whims rather
than evidence from the perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art at
the time of the filing of the patent application in question. For
example, the appropriate, constrained inquiry might ask whether a
person of ordinary skill, at the time of the filing of the patent
application in question, given their own skill combined with the
disclosure of the specification, would have recognized that the claimed
invention was the result of human effort and had practical utility. 226
D. Flexibility
While seemingly in tension with the last guiding principle,
flexibility is an important consideration that should be taken into
account when considering how to amend the patent statute.
Flexibility, in the sense I use it, does not refer to malleability, but
instead the ability of the law to be applied meaningfully to new,
unforeseen, and even unimagined human activities. That is one of the
very purposes of the patent system - to create economic incentives to
encourage investment in research and development on the forefront of
scientific and engineering thought; to expand the possibilities of the
human race; to make the future safer, healthier, happier - in a word
better - through new and improved technology. 227 To do that, the
law of eligibility must be applicable to new and different - even
unimagined - technologies. Those technologies should be subject to
the relevant constraints.
226 On the other hand, inquiries into human effort and practical utility may be
more akin to the inquiry into novelty pursuant to § 102, which does not invoke the
perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art in the same way as the inquiry into non-
obviousness. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (omitting any reference to the
perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art), with id. § 103 (referencing the
perspective of "a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed
invention pertains").
227 See generally Rich, Principles, supra note 221.
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IV. PATHS FORWARD
Given the need to correct the law of eligibility and the
appropriateness of the task, what substantive approaches should
Congress consider? And how do those approaches compare to the
guiding principles of broad eligibility, clarity, constraint on judicial
intervention, and flexibility? In this Part, I consider some possibilities.
A. The Laundry List Approach
One approach is what I call the "laundry list" approach. This
approach would amend the patent statute to identify subject matter
that is eligible or ineligible for patenting. In this way, Congress would
decide now what subject matter is eligible and ineligible, rather than
provide a rule or standard for the USPTO or courts to apply in the
future to make this determination. As I have highlighted, this
approach could take two forms. Either Congress could identify
specifically what subject matter is eligible, or Congress could identify
specifically what subject matter is ineligible.
One way of formulating such a list is to study U.S. law to develop a
list codifying appropriate USPTO and judicial decisions on point.
Moreover, the laundry list approach might borrow the basic
framework of the European Patent Convention. It sets forth a list of
ineligible subject matter in EPC Article 52, paragraph (2):
The following in particular shall not be regarded as inventions
within the meaning of paragraph 1:
(a) discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical methods;
(b) aesthetic creations;
(c) schemes, rules and methods for performing mental acts,
playing games or doing business, and programs for computers;
(d) presentations of information.228
In this manner, the European Patent Convention identifies
particular categories of alleged inventions that are not eligible for
patenting, regardless of whether they are "new, involve an inventive
step and are susceptible of industrial application," the other statutory
European patentability requirements listed in EPC Article 52,
228 Convention on the Grant of European Patents art. 52(2), Oct. 5, 1973, 1065




paragraph (1).229 But what about the argument that all inventions to
one degree or another are based upon "scientific theories" or even
"mathematical methods," two of the listed exceptions? 230 In EPC
Article 52, paragraph (3), the European Patent Convention limits the
applicability of each exception listed in paragraph (2) to situations
where the exception is claimed "as such":
Paragraph 2 shall exclude the patentability of the subject-
matter or activities referred to therein only to the extent to
which a European patent application or European patent
relates to such subject-matter or activities as such.231
In other words, claims directed only to scientific theories are
ineligible. Claims directed to anything more than scientific theories are
eligible. Thus, claims to practical applications of scientific theories
would be eligible.
In certain respects, the European Patent Convention's list renders
ineligible certain categories of subject matter that the existing U.S.
patent statute likely also categorically renders ineligible as a matter of
utility patent law, such as "aesthetic creations,"232 "scientific
theories,"233 and "methods for performing mental acts." 234 In other
respects, however, it likely renders ineligible certain categories of
subject matter that the existing U.S. patent statute likely does not
render categorically ineligible, such as "schemes, rules and methods
229 Id. art. 52(1).
230 See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293
(2012) ("[A]ll inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws
of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.").
231 European Patent Convention, supra note 228, art. 52(3).
232 Compare European Patent Convention, supra note 228, art. 52(2) (listing
"aesthetic creations" as ineligible), with 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (describing inventions
eligible for utility patents as "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter").
233 Compare European Patent Convention, supra note 228, art. 52(2) (listing
"scientific theories" as ineligible), with 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (describing inventions
eligible for utility patents as "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter").
234 See Application of Yuan, 188 F.2d 377, 380 (C.C.P.A. 1951) ("This court has
deemed it to have been thoroughly established by decisions of various courts that
purely mental steps do not form a process which falls within the scope of patentability
as defined by statute."). Compare European Patent Convention, supra note 228, art.
52(2) (listing "methods for performing mental acts" as ineligible), with 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 (2012) (limiting eligible inventions to processes, machines, manufactures, or
compositions of matter).
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for . . . doing business" 235 and "programs for computers." 236 What I
consider here is not the possibility that Congress adopt each exception
listed in the European Patent Convention, but instead the idea that
Congress consider listing explicit exceptions to eligibility, whatever
they should be, based on its own assessment of the governing policies
and unique concerns associated with each potential exception.
Such an approach, depending upon its implementation, might
comport with the principles of broad eligibility, clarity, and constraint
on judicial intervention. First, if Congress included few and narrow
exceptions to eligibility, the principle of broad eligibility would be
furthered.237 Second, this approach would likely score high on the
index of clarity, at least for existing technologies, because Congress
would confront and resolve arguments about categories of technology
that should be ineligible for patenting. The approach would provide
certainty with respect to those categories it included and did not
include. Congress would need only to express its conclusions in clear
terms. Third, Congress could constrain judicial intervention using this
approach by including a similar qualification compared to EPC Article
52, paragraph (3). That is, rather than ask whether a claim includes
"something more" or "significantly more" than a natural law,238 for
235 Compare European Patent Convention, supra note 228, art. 52(2) (listing
"schemes, rules and methods for ... doing business" as ineligible), with Bilski v.
Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 606-09 (2010) (refusing to interpret 35 U.S.C. § 101 to exclude
business methods).
236 Compare European Patent Convention, supra note 228, art. 52(2) (listing
"programs for computers" as ineligible), with DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P.,
773 F.3d 1245, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (finding claims to a computer-implemented
invention running a computer program to be eligible for patenting).
237 Whether this is reasonable to expect is uncertain. Where this approach may
suffer is setting on the table the ability to exclude subject matter from patentability.
Special interest groups would come out of the woodwork, seeking to have their pet
technology excluded from patentability, without regard for the policies protecting new
entrants and efforts to invent but instead based on self-serving interests in maintaining
market share and, in fact, preventing new entrants into established technology fields.
While special interest groups would no doubt seek to influence any statutory
amendment of the patent laws related to eligibility, this particular approach might be
the most vulnerable in this regard because it squarely raises the possibility of express
exceptions to eligibility in particular areas of commerce rather than forward-looking
standards governing all eligibility for all technologies.
238 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354-55 (2014) ("[In applying
the § 101 exception, we must distinguish between patents that claim the 'buildin[g]
block[s]' of human ingenuity and those that integrate the building blocks into
something more, thereby 'transform ingl' them into a patent-eligible invention."
(citations omitted) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132
S. Ct. 1289, 1303 (2012))).
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example, Congress could expressly say that the exceptions to
eligibility are limited to situations where the exception is claimed "as
such," that is where there is nothing more than the exception claimed.
In other words, anything added to a natural law, essentially claiming
any practical application of a natural law, would be eligible for
patenting. In addition to this limitation, however, to avoid further
judicially created, non-statutory exceptions to eligibility, a provision
would need to be included indicating that the only exceptions to
eligibility are those listed expressly in the statute. This would also help
increase certainty with respect to future technologies; rightly or
wrongly from the perspective of policy, future technologies would be
clearly eligible.
Where this laundry list approach does not fare well, however, is the
principle of flexibility. By definition, this approach would not
expressly contemplate specific future technologies; Congress would
confront and resolve disputes over the eligibility of only existing
technologies. If Congress were to draft the statute to list exceptions,
then presumably all future technologies would be eligible because they
would not be listed (as just discussed). If Congress were to draft the
statute to list inclusions, then presumably all future technologies
would not be eligible because they would not be listed. There would
be a default rule. The goal of the patent system to encourage
investment in the development of new technologies counsels in favor
of listing an exclusive set of limited exceptions to eligibility, which
would leave in place a default rule of inclusion. And, indeed, that is
consistent with the European approach. 239 It would presumably
(absent delegation) be the task of future Congresses, not the courts, to
identify ineligible subject matter. 240 But it seems highly unlikely that
Congress would confront and resolve arguments concerning the
eligibility of every new technology.
239 1 am not the only one to advocate for study of foreign approaches to solving the
mess of confusion in which U.S. law is currently mired. See generally, e.g., Brendon
Beheshti, Getting Beyond Abstract Confusion: How the United Kingdom's Jurisprudence
Can Aid in Developing an Analytic Framework for Patent-Eligibility in Light of Alice v.
CLS Bank, 10 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 137 (2014).
240 Alternatively, this authority to create exceptions to patent eligibility could be
delegated to an administrative body such as the USPTO. What this proposal would
require, however, would be determinations of eligibility exceptions using rulemaking
rather than adjudication. The expertise and nimbleness of the agency would counsel
in favor of delegation; concerns with agency capture would counsel against delegation.
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B. Creating a Workable Eligibility Standard
Another approach is to create a workable standard with objective
limitations on eligibility. This approach is most consistent with the
current statute. Indeed, one way to think of this approach is to have
Congress more clearly articulate in the patent statute the appropriate
tests for eligibility. In this regard, consider the two primary eligibility
constraints already existing in the present statute.
1. Anything Under the Sun Made by Man
First, consider what I call the subject matter requirement. It is the
requirement that a claim describe one of the listed categories of
eligible inventions: a process, machine, manufacture, or composition
of matter. The primary function of the subject matter requirement is to
eliminate from eligibility anything that is not the result of human
effort. 241 In other words, for purposes of the subject matter
requirement, eligibility extends to "anything under the sun that is
made by man." 242 Natural phenomena and natural laws are not eligible
because they are not the result of human effort. 24 3 Given the Supreme
Court's confusion of this aspect of § 101 in Mayo and Alice, Congress
could insert this original, appropriate understanding of the subject
matter requirement into the patent statute.
The advantage of focusing on whether a claim describes something
created by man can be demonstrated by using an old, celebrated case
as an example of its application. In 1911, Judge Learned Hand decided
that a claim to isolated and purified adrenaline describes eligible
subject matter:
[E]ven if it were merely an extracted product without change,
there is no rule that such products are not patentable. [The
named inventor] was the first to make it available for any use
by removing it from the other gland-tissue in which it was
found, and, while it is of course possible logically to call this a
purification of the principle, it became for every practical
purpose a new thing commercially and therapeutically. That
was a good ground for a patent.244
241 See Taylor, supra note 15, at 212.
242 S. REP. No. 82-1979 (1952), as reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2399.
243 See Taylor, supra note 15, at 214-15.
244 Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 103 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911),
affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Parke-Davis & Co v. H. K. Mulford & Co, 196 F.
496 (2d Cir. 1912).
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Judge Hand explained that a natural product, extracted from tissue
without change, is eligible because of the human effort required to
make it available for use. Stated otherwise, the decision rested on the
recognition that isolated and purified adrenaline does not exist, as
such, in nature. 245 Isolated and purified adrenaline was the product of
human effort; someone removed it from the gland-tissue in which it
was found.
A test focusing on whether the claimed subject matter is the result
of human effort may explain at least part of the Supreme Court's
recent decision in Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, Inc.246 With respect to the first set of claims at issue in the
case, those involving isolated DNA sequences, the Court concluded
that they were not eligible. In explaining its ruling, the Court
highlighted that Myriad's claims were not
saved by the fact that isolating DNA from the human genome
severs chemical bonds and thereby creates a nonnaturally
occurring molecule. Myriad's claims are simply not expressed
in terms of chemical composition, nor do they rely in any way
on the chemical changes that result from the isolation of a
particular section of DNA. Instead, the claims understandably
focus on the genetic information encoded in the BRCA1 and
BRCA2 genes. 247
In other words, all Myriad claimed was the information stored in a
particular DNA sequence; the information, as such, had already
existed in nature. Had Myriad expressed its claims in terms of the
chemical composition of the molecule that its inventors created -
which included a severed chemical bond - the Court's decision might
have changed. Indeed, with respect to the second set of claims, those
involving modified DNA called cDNA - which includes naturally-
occurring "exons" but not naturally-occurring "introns" - the court
explained its holding of eligibility based on the fact that a person had
created something that did not exist in nature:
[T]he lab technician unquestionably creates something new
when cDNA is made. cDNA retains the naturally occurring
exons of DNA, but it is distinct from the DNA from which it
was derived. As a result, cDNA is not a "product of nature"
245 See Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253 F.2d 156, 163 (4th Cir.
1958). But see Ex parte Latimer, 1889 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 123.
246 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
247 Id. at 2118.
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and is patent eligible under § 101, except insofar as very short
series of DNA may have no intervening introns to remove
when creating cDNA. In that situation, a short strand of cDNA
may be indistinguishable from natural DNA.248
Here the Court explained that the second set of claims identified
something "distinct from the DNA from which it was derived" and
thus was something "new." It makes sense in this context that the
Court focuses on human effort: "the lab technician ... creates
something new." 249 What the lab technician creates is not a "product
of nature" but instead, so to speak, a product of that lab technician's
effort. In other words, it is the result of human effort.
Where an analysis focusing on human effort differs from the
Supreme Court's recent approach to eligibility in Mayo and Alice is
that any human contribution to the natural law or phenomena would
meet the subject matter requirement. The Supreme Court, after Alice
at least, requires the claim to include an "inventive concept," which is
something "significantly more" than the natural phenomena or natural
law.250 Rather than adopt Judge Hand's focus solely on the presence or
absence of human effort, Mayo and Alice indicate that human effort
alone is not enough. It is not enough, for example, if the human effort
is "well-understood, routine, conventional activity previously engaged
in by researchers in the field." 251
In short, Congress might insert into the patent statute language
more clearly articulating the fundamental idea behind the subject
matter requirement that eligible subject matter must be the result of
human effort. This language would set forth a standard for the USPTO
and courts to apply, and this standard would be consistent with the
principles of broad eligibility, clarity, constraint on judicial
intervention, and flexibility. First, requiring human effort would not
unduly constrain the breadth of eligibility. Any minimal human
contribution to the claimed subject matter would render that subject
matter eligible. Second, a requirement of human effort would provide
a clear standard for the USPTO and courts to apply; either the claimed
subject matter is the result of human effort or it is not. Third, to meet
248 Id. at 2119.
249 Id. (emphasis added).
250 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294
(2012).
251 Id. ("We find that the process claims at issue here do not satisfy these
conditions. In particular, the steps in the claimed processes (apart from the natural
laws themselves) involve well-understood, routine, conventional activity previously
engaged in by researchers in the field.").
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the principle of restraint on judicial intervention, any amendment to
articulate a standard focusing on human effort would need to include
additional language explaining that the requirement is the only subject
matter requirement. Fourth, this approach would create a flexible
standard applicable to new and unforeseen technologies. Regardless of
the field of technology, currently existing or yet unimagined, to be
eligible the subject matter would have to be the result of human effort.
2. Practical Application or Embodiment
Second, consider the other aspect of the existing statutory eligibility
constraint: the utility requirement. I have discussed that the function
of the utility requirement is to eliminate from eligibility anything that
is not a practical application of a natural law, physical phenomenon,
or abstract idea.2 52 Indeed, the Supreme Court's statement that
"[gIroundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant discovery does not by
itself satisfy the § 101 inquiry"253 is true only in the sense that the
correct § 101 inquiry asks whether a claim describes a practical
application of a discovery. What is not required is an "inventive
concept" or "inventive application" of a discovery. Given the Supreme
Court's confusion of this aspect of § 101 in Mayo and Alice, Congress
could insert the correct understanding into the patent statute.
What is unique about this part of the question of eligibility is that
the current patent statute already includes fairly clear language on
point. In particular, § 101 already expresses a "usefulness"
requirement.254 The Supreme Court in Brenner v. Manson interpreted
that requirement - now known as the utility requirement - as
requiring the claimed subject matter to have a "specific" and
"substantial" utility. 255 Courts have used "practical" and "substantial,"
in this context, to mean the same thing. 256 In particular, the modern
utility requirement requires a practical utility, which means "that that
claimed invention has a significant and presently available benefit to
the public." 25 7 Thus, to express in the patent statute the relevant
252 See Taylor, supra note 15, at 207.
253 Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2117.
254 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
255 See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534-35 (1966).
256 See, e.g., In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (discussing the
requirement as the "practical utility" requirement); Fujikawa v. Wattanasin, 93 F.3d
1559, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1996); In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (same);
Cross v. lizuka, 753 F.2d 1040, 1044 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (referring to "substantial or
practical utility"); Application of Kirk, 376 F.2d 936, 948 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
257 In re Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1371.
20171 2205
University of California, Davis
governing standard, the Supreme Court's holding in Brenner v. Manson
needs only to be codified; Congress, for example, might explain in the
statute that the claimed subject matter must be a practical application
of a natural law, physical phenomenon, or abstract idea.
Since current utility law already requires a practical utility, and thus
patent claims already must cover a practical application of a natural
law, physical phenomenon, or abstract idea, the more important
aspect of codifying this law is eliminating the more strenuous
requirement that the claims be directed to an "inventive concept" or
an "inventive application" of a natural law, physical phenomenon, or
abstract idea. Thus, negative statutory language might be appropriate
to clarify that eligibility law no longer includes a search for an
"inventive concept."
This approach - codifying courts' interpretation of the utility
requirement and eliminating the search for an "inventive concept" -
would comport with the principles of broad eligibility, clarity,
constraint on judicial intervention, and flexibility. First, eliminating
the search for an "inventive application" in favor of a requirement of a
practical application would certainly broaden eligibility as compared
to the current law. While the interpretation of the practical utility
requirement to require a "substantial" or "significant" benefit to the
public would not appear to extend eligibility to inventions having
"any" benefit to the public - such that operability is not all that is
required to show a practical utility - courts' application of this aspect
of the utility requirement has not proven to be unduly stringent. 258
Second, the law governing the requirement of a practical application
has not proven to be unworkable; it is likely sufficiently clear.259
Third, again to meet the principle of restraint on judicial intervention,
any amendment to articulate a standard focusing on practical utility
would need to include additional language explaining that the
requirement - the claimed subject matter be a practical, as opposed
258 See, e.g., id. ("Courts have used the labels 'practical utility' and 'real world'
utility interchangeably in determining whether an invention offers a 'substantial'
utility. Indeed, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals stated that "'practical utility"
is a shorthand way of attributing "real-world" value to claimed subject matter. In
other words, one skilled in the art can use a claimed discovery in a manner which
provides some immediate benefit to the public.' It thus is clear that an application must
show that an invention is useful to the public as disclosed in its current form, not that
it may prove useful at some future date after further research. Simply put, to satisfy
the 'substantial' utility requirement, an asserted use must show that that claimed





to an inventive, application of a natural law, physical phenomena, or
abstract idea - is the only eligibility requirement beyond the subject
matter requirement. Fourth, a standard focusing on practical utility
would provide a workable standard independent of technology areas
and would, thus, be appropriate for application to new and unforeseen
technologies.
C. Laying the Ghost of the Non-Statutory Exceptions
The third approach would be to "lay the ghost" of the non-statutory
exceptions to eligibility. 260 In other words, Congress would expressly
eliminate the non-statutory eligibility requirements. The relevant
policy concerns would instead be addressed by the patentability and
specification requirements actually expressed in the patent statute.261
Michael Risch, for example, has advocated for "rigorous application"
of the existing patentability and specification requirements in §H 102,
103, and 112 rather than application of enforcement of "unclear and
undefined subject matter rules based on unsupportable statutory
interpretations" of § 101.262
260 The concept of eliminating the non-statutory exceptions to eligibility - and the
title of this subpart - resemble the effort by Judge Rich to eliminate the so-called
"invention" requirement in the Patent Act of 1952. See Giles S. Rich & Paul R. Michel,
Laying the Ghost of the "Invention" Requirement, 1 APLA Q.J. 26 (1972-1973),
reprinted in 41 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 2-5 (2013).
261 Even without a legislative amendment to eliminate the non-statutory
exceptions, there is an argument that § 101 is not a "condition of patentability" and
therefore failure to comply with it is not a proper defense in litigation, even if it is
enforceable by the USPTO during the original examination of a patent. See id. at 14.
This position has been advanced by at least one patent law professor. See David
Hricik, Why Section 101 Is Neither a "Condition of Patentability" nor an Invalidity
Defense, PATENTLYO BLOG (Sept. 16, 2013), http://patentlyo.com/hricik/2013/09/why-
section-101 -is-neither-a-condition-of-patentability-nor-an-invalidity-defense.html. To
the extent this position is correct and yet the relevant underlying policy concerns
should be considered not just in front of the USPTO but also during litigation, one
solution is to focus on the relevant inquiries using the traditional inquiries under
H§ 102, 103, and 112. Indeed, those other sections of the patent statute already
address those policy concerns and provide administrable tests. See Taylor, supra note
15, at 212-21.
262 Michael Risch, Everything is Patentable, 75 TENN. L. REv. 591, 606-07 (2008)
("Attention to rigorous application of the patentability standards would replace
unclear and undefined subject matter rules based on unsupportable statutory
interpretations of the Patent Act."). But see Lemley et al., supra note 189, at 1327
("One of us has gone so far as to argue that the best solution is to abandon all
exceptions, including the historical ones. Whether or not this approach is correct, it is
unlikely to gain judicial support in light of Bilski. Therefore, we take the common law
abstract ideas exception as a given, and seek to articulate a reason to preclude
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If Congress eliminated the non-statutory exceptions, and in
particular the misguided search for an "inventive application," it
would be similar to the approach taken in the Patent Act of 1952,
when Congress eliminated the separate "invention" requirement in
favor of the non-obviousness requirement. 263 The drafters of the
Patent Act of 1952 deliberately omitted any reference to the
"invention" requirement to "free the law and lawyers from bondage to
that old and meaningless term." 264 In its place, they created the non-
obviousness requirement of § 103. As a result, "[a]n examination of
the presence or absence of 'invention' or of precedents on that muddy
issue is not called for"265 The reason the drafters eliminated the
patentability for abstract ideas and a corresponding way to recognize when patent
claims are too abstract."). The Supreme Court relied upon "Risch's change of mind,"
reflected in a comparison of the views expressed in his articles Everything is Patentable
and Life after Bilski, to support its view that the written description and enablement
requirements of § 112 will not meet "the risk that a patent on [a law of nature] would
significantly impede future innovation." Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1304 (2012). I have explained elsewhere why I believe the
Supreme Court and Risch are wrong on the issue of whether the written description
and enablement requirements work to eliminate the risk of patent claims impeding
future innovation. See Taylor, supra note 15, at 199-203.
263 As explained in the Senate and House Reports associated with the Patent Act of
1952:
Section 103, for the first time in our statute, provides a condition which
exists in the law and has existed for more than 100 years, but only by reason
of decisions of the court. An invention which has been made, and which is
new in the sense that the same thing has not been made before, may still not
be patentable if the difference between the new thing and what was known
before is not considered sufficiently great to warrant a patent. That has been
expressed in a large variety of ways in decisions of the courts and in writing.
Section 103 states this requirement in the title. It refers to the difference
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art, meaning
what was known before as described in section 102. If this difference is such
that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time to a
person skilled in the art, then the subject matter cannot be patented. That
provision paraphrases language which has often been used in decisions of
the courts, and the section is added to the statute for uniformity and
definiteness. This section should have a stabilizing effect and minimize great
departures which have appeared in some cases.
S. REP. No. 82-1979 (1952), as reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2399-400.
Because the Senate Report duplicates the relevant text from the House Report, I will
cite only to the former.
264 Rich, Principles, supra note 221, at 145.
265 Giles S. Rich, The Vague Concept of "Invention" as Replaced by § 103 of the 1952




common law "invention" requirement in favor of the statutory non-
obviousness requirement was to put in place an administrable test, one
with objectively-determinable components to the analysis. 266
Likewise, to correct the problems with the modern eligibility
requirement, Congress might eliminate any eligibility requirement in
§ 101 in favor of the patentability and specification requirements
included in the remainder of the patent statute. And, at the same time,
Congress might draft more clear language in the remainder of the
patent statute to address any policy concerns not already addressed by
the remaining patentability and specification requirements. 267
This approach would ensure consideration of whether the
patentability and specification requirements in H§ 102, 103, and 112
do all of the work necessary to eliminate the patenting of unworthy
claims. These patentability and specification requirements do already
address many of the relevant policy concerns upon which the Supreme
Court has focused in its cases on eligibility. 268 The elimination of the
"implicit exceptions" would therefore eliminate unnecessary overlap.
Moreover, it would increase the administrability of the patent statute;
it would eliminate a non-statutory, purely subjective evaluation of
patentability in favor of statutory approaches with objective
constraints. Consider, however, whether the statutory subject matter
and utility requirements need to be retained to prevent patents from
issuing on unworthy applicants.
266 See Rich, Principles, supra note 221, at 146 ("There is a vast difference between
basing a decision on exercise of the inventive or creative faculty, or genius, ingenuity,
patentable novelty, flashes, surprises and excitement, on the one hand, and basing it
on unobviousness to one of ordinary skill in the art on the other. It is possible to
determine what art is involved, what type of skill is possessed by ordinary workers in
it, and come to some conclusion as to what 'ordinary skill' would be at a given time.").
267 See supra Part II.B. This approach, in particular, would require advocates on
both sides of the debate over eligible subject matter to consider whether the existing
patentability and specification requirements outside of § 101 appropriately deal with
subject matter that might be most problematic, such as a method of shooting a free
throw or a method of singing an opera. All approaches, however, ought to be analyzed
to consider whether they appropriately treat the most problematic types of claims. If
the conclusion is that the approach does not appropriately treat these types of claims,
the next step is to consider the addition of an appropriate, narrowly-tailored
patentability requirement, such as a limitation on patents to "technological arts" or
"technological fields of invention." The adoption of any additional patentability
requirement would be similar to the adoption of the non-obviousness requirement in
1952 - the adoption of a new patentability requirement appropriately tailored to
address a specific policy-based problem with the existing statute.
268 See Taylor, supra note 15, at 212-21.
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Arguably there is no need for the separate utility requirement in
§ 101. Courts have already interpreted the enablement requirement of
§ 112 as requiring that the specification disclose how to use the
claimed subject matter. 269 If claimed subject matter is, in fact, useless,
a specification cannot teach how to use it.270 This aspect of the
enablement requirement, however, has been an implicit requirement of
§ 112;271 utility could be more clearly explained in § 112. In
particular, Congress could amend 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) to explicitly state
that "[tihe specification shall contain a written description of the
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it for at
least one practical use, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to
enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which
it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same."
If the enablement requirement does not require claims to describe
the practical uses disclosed in the specification, however, there
arguably is a need to retain the subject matter requirement; it alone in
the patent statute would ensure that the claimed subject matter is the
result of human effort. To show the importance of the subject matter
requirement, consider the first discovery of a waterfall, something that
at the time of the first discovery, let us assume, was unknown and
non-obvious given existing knowledge. Imagine that the discoverer of
the waterfall applied for a patent with a claim directed to the waterfall
itself, where the specification disclosed a practical use of the waterfall,
for example to turn a watermill's turbine to drive gears and,
ultimately, to grind grain. Certainly the waterfall is proven to be useful
by the disclosure in the specification of its use to grind grain. If the
enablement requirement does not require that the claim include that
use, however, then the claim may cover only the naturally-occurring
phenomena itself, the waterfall in this example. This simple example
269 The Federal Circuit has held that utility is an express requirement of 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 ("Whoever invents ... any new and useful ... composition of matter ... may
obtain a patent therefor . . . .") and an implicit aspect of the separate enablement
requirement found in 35 U.S.C. § 112 ("The specification shall contain a written
description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in
such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to
which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the
same. . . ."). See In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1995). According to the
court, "if a claimed invention does not have utility, the specification cannot enable
one to use it." Id.; see also In reJolles, 628 F.2d 1322, 1326 n.10 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
270 See Application of Fouche, 439 F.2d 1237, 1243 (C.C.P.A. 1971) ("[If such
compositions are in fact useless, appellant's specification cannot have taught how to
use them.").
271 In re Brana, 51 F.3d at 1564.
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indicates that, if the subject matter requirement in § 101 were deleted,
there would still be a need to codify the underlying requirement of
human effort. To do so, 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) might be amended to state
that "[tihe specification shall conclude with one or more claims
particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter
which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention and at
least one practical use of that subject matter."
Regardless of the exact implementation, this approach -
eliminating at least the "implicit exceptions" and perhaps even the
utility and subject matter requirements of § 101 in favor of addressing
the relevant policy concerns in the statutory doctrines expressed in
H 102, 103, and 112 - would, in effect, be a codification of the best
form of the patentability and specification patent law doctrines
necessary to ensure that only deserving patents issue. Depending upon
its implementation, this approach would be consistent with the
principles of broad eligibility, clarity, constraint on judicial
intervention, and flexibility. First, the elimination of the "implicit
exceptions" that have given rise to the question of whether the
claimed invention includes an "inventive concept," would ensure
broad eligibility. Elimination of the subject matter and utility
requirements in § 101 in favor of the patentability and specification
requirements in H§ 102, 103, and 112 would as well. In effect, there
would be no constraints on eligibility; all constraints would be matters
of statutory patentability and specification requirements. Second, the
elimination of duplicative standards would, in and of itself, increase
clarity with respect to the patent statute. Of course, any amendment to
the existing patentability and specification requirements in §§ 102,
103, and 112 would need to be clear. Third, to ensure that the
judiciary does not import into the analyses required by those
remaining statutory sections its misguided common law regarding the
displaced "implicit exceptions," it would probably be necessary to
include clear statements in the legislation, or even in the amended
statute, that the "implicit exceptions" have been eliminated in favor of
statutory patentability and specification requirements in §§ 102, 103,
and 112. Fourth, this approach would revolve around expressing
generally applicable governing standards that would apply going
forward to future technologies and, thus, satisfy the need for
flexibility.
CONCLUSION
One of my favorite movies is the 1985 cult blockbuster Back to the
Future. For readers unfamiliar with its storyline, suffice it to say that a
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character named Marty McFly travels back in time to 1955 using a
time machine, inadvertently interferes with history, and then spends
the majority of the movie trying to undo what he has done and return
safely to 1985.
Well, if you close your eyes and hum a few notes from your favorite
1950s tune, you may feel like you are back in the 1950s, and not just
because you are humming "Mr. Sandman" or "The Ballad of Davy
Crockett." 272 You might feel that way because, like in 1952, there is a
crisis in patent law, and the time has come for the crisis to be resolved.
In 1952, the crisis was uncertainty and reduced incentive to invent
caused by the Supreme Court's misguided precedent regarding the so-
called "invention" requirement. 273 Today, the crisis is uncertainty and
reduced incentive to invent caused by the Supreme Court's misguided
precedent regarding the eligibility requirement and, in particular, the
non-statutory exceptions and the search for the so-called "inventive
concept." 274
Now, if we could only send Marty McFly's time machine to PJ.
Federico and Giles Rich - the primary authors of the Patent Act of 1952
- and bring them back to the future. They drafted a statutory section,
35 U.S.C. § 103, that - no matter what the Supreme Court says 275 -
272 Marty McFly heard both of these songs when he visited 1955. BACK TO THE
FUTURE (Universal Studios 1985).
273 See generally Rich & Michel, supra note 260.
274 See generally Taylor, supra note 15.
275 The Supreme Court has said that the Patent Act of 1952 merely codified the
Supreme Court's law on the invention requirement, but the authors of the relevant
section intended otherwise. See Rich & Michel, supra note 260, at 17 ("Hopefully, that
clears up the 'codification' question. Whatever you call it, the purpose was to
substitute § 103 for the requirement of 'invention' and for all prior case law, including
the A&P [clase, even though some cases contained the same principles. It was to be
statutory, not case law in the future."); id. ("On the point of § 103 being 'codification'
it is interesting to consider the last sentence of the section[,] which says[,]
'Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.'
The specific intent of that sentence, which courts universally accepted without
question, was to overrule the Cuno case dictum that a 'flash of genius' was necessary.
One cannot call that 'codification."'); id. at 15 n.35 ("Section 103 was not a
requirement 'for invention,' it was a substitute for it as the reports made clear in the
discussion of § 103 on p. 7 of the House Report and on p. 6 of the Senate Report.").
Compare Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1966) ("We have concluded that
the 1952 Act was intended to codify judicial precedents embracing the principle long
ago announced by this Court in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 11 How. 248, 13 L. Ed. 683
(1851), and that, while the clear language of § 103 places emphasis on an inquiry into
obviousness, the general level of innovation necessary to sustain patentability remains
the same."), with Rich & Michel, supra note 260, at 9 ("The gist of Hotchkiss v.
Greenwood is that the Supreme Court, like Jefferson, sensed that Congress had not
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overturned much of the Supreme Court's precedent regarding the
"invention" requirement and put in place a statutory non-obviousness
requirement that provided objective constraints on patentability that
were notably lacking in the "invention" requirement. Given their success
in 1952,276 we could no doubt use their help crafting an appropriate and
effective legislative response to the current crisis.
included in the statute a necessary limitation on the grant of patents and added that
condition itself. This was judicial legislation. The Court added a condition but, as it
turned out, it was not much of a standard, because it was too vague. The condition, as
refined and sharpened in § 103, creates a statutory system under which all patents
granted pursuant to statute do serve to promote the progress of useful arts because,
being for unobvious subject matter, they necessarily add to the sum of useful
knowledge. In any event, for the century following Hotchkiss v. Greenwood we had
what was called the 'requirement for invention' which I emphasize, we have not had
for the past twenty years. Instead we have § 103.").
276 Federico and Rich's solution to the crisis in 1952, the amendment of the patent
statute to include a non-obviousness requirement in 35 U.S.C. § 103, has withstood
the test of time - and the Supreme Court. Ironically, the current crisis relates to
another part of the patent statute drafted by Federico and Rich, 35 U.S.C. § 101, and
the Supreme Court's unwillingness to apply the text of that provision without
judicially-created non-statutory exceptions. Thus, in the words of Dr. Emmett Brown,
the inventor of Marty McFly's time machine, if Federico and Rich showed up today we
might say, "Oh [n]o, no, no, no, no.... [Y]ou and [the non-obviousness requirement
both] turn out fine. It's [§ 101], [P.J. and Giles]. Something's gotta be done about
[§ 101]!" See BACK TO THE FUTURE (Universal Studios 1985).
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